78 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



any one of them really thought he had given even the 

 slightest mechanical explanation of the facts in question 

 by doing so. In fact, what they have brought forward, it 

 seems to me, does not even deserve to be called " analogy," 

 much less " explanation " of the historical basis of reacting 

 as it really is. 1 



In the first place, we must notice that speaking 

 psychologically mere " memory," as the faculty of simple 

 storing and identifying, is far from being the same as the 

 " historical basis " as it plays its part in action. In psycho- 

 logical terms " association " comes in here, besides " memory ' 

 pure and simple, and not merely association alone but 

 association submitted to judgment. Here again the 

 " historical basis }: is inseparable from its role in the 

 " individuality of correspondence." 



The so-called elastic after-effect, and some similar 

 phenomena, have occasionally been called analogies to the 

 historical basis. In my opinion, however, they are not even 

 analogies to simple " memory " ; they may be analogies to 

 " fatigue," but that is about the opposite to what is con- 

 cerned in " experience." Certainly an elastic ball is 

 " altered " by its " history " ; but our critics must remember 

 what we understand by this word in our definition, which is 

 throughout of the style of a technical term. Others have 

 objected to my argument by saying that the " reactions " of a 

 mountain, with regard to its being slowly washed away by 



1 A very careful analysis of my Seele has been given by Becher (Zeitschr. 

 f. Psych. 45, 1907, p. 401). Becher is right in saying that my two "criteria" 

 ought always to be regarded together. But his mechanical analogy to their 

 being at work together (p. 428) fails, since he does not consider that the 

 historical stimuli and the reactions of my "historical basis" belong to 

 different fields of events. 



