INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS 145 



In this way, regarding it only as a kind of description, 

 I see no fundamental difficulty in speaking of entelechy's 

 primary " knowing and willing " ; at least no other descrip- 

 tion of what happens seems to be derivable from any species 

 of analogy. 



ENTELECHY AND THE " INDIVIDUUM ' : 



We shall now regard entelechy from yet another point 

 of view, necessitating a comparison between organisms and 

 crystals. 



From ancient times the organism has been called an 

 individuum, i.e. a something that cannot be divided without 

 ceasing to be what it was. " Individua " in this meaning 

 are the atoms of the Organic, the words " individuum " and 

 aro/jiov indeed expressing the same thing. If this view is 

 held, entelechy must be said to represent the individuum, 

 to be itself individualising. But it is only with some 

 restriction that modern science can make use of the con- 

 cept of the individuum. We know from experimental 

 work that the organism, both adult and embryo, can be 

 divided without change of its nature, since it restores its 

 parts to new wholes. The term individuum, therefore, if 

 applied to bodily forms, is incorrect, at least in very many 

 cases : parts of an original individuum may be individua 

 too, at least potentially. Perhaps it would be more success- 

 ful to apply the term individuum to entelechies only and 

 not to bodily forms : but if we do so the fundamental 

 problems of the divisibility of entelechy and its relation to 

 matter at once present themselves. The discussion of 



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