PART I 



THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY 



A. ENTELECHY AND UNIVOCAL 

 DETERMINATION 



A COMPLETE system of ontology has to develop the sum of 

 aprioristic concepts and principles regarding nature on the 

 principles of reasoning. It cannot be our task to do so 

 here, and it would not even be necessary for our immediate 

 purposes. Our endeavour is, in the first place, to show how 

 our concept of entelechy as an elemental natural factor is 

 related to those concepts of general ontology which play 

 any part in the science of inorganic nature. On a later 

 occasion a few words on the theory of categories will be 

 added. 



The concept of the univocal determination of being and be- 

 coming may be called the very starting-point of a philosophy 

 of nature. No states and no events in nature are without 

 a sufficient reason for their being such as they are at such 

 a place and time, and the same thing always is or happens 

 under the same conditions. These are the most general 

 expressions of the principle of univocality. Of course, 

 nothing in the doctrine of entelechy is opposed to them ; 



given certain circumstances, and given a certain entelechy 



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