206 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



Once more we remark here that nothing " psychical," 

 in the proper meaning of the word, is introduced by our 

 entelechy : entelechy is an elemental factor of nature, con- 

 ceived to explain a certain class of natural phenomena. 



A Few Words on " Explaining ' : 



I well know that the word " explaining ' : is very 

 ambiguous, and that in all " explanation ' there is a good 

 deal of moving in a circle. Constants are said to explain, 

 and so are entelechies and specific kinds of forces and 

 energies. What is actually done here is nothing but a 

 kind of subsuming the single phenomena under certain 

 classes of generalities derived from the singularities them- 

 selves, and the question must remain at this very un- 

 satisfactory point in " pure " phenomenalism or " empirical 

 idealism," as advocated by Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, and 

 others. On the basis of our critically idealistic philosophy, 

 we may look a little more optimistically upon " explaining." 

 According to this doctrine, the generalities which are con- 

 sidered to " explain " are formulated according to the 

 immanent and categorical principles of reasoning a priori, 

 and what empiricism adds to them only consists in the co- 

 ordination of some truly inductive general terms with the 

 categorical generalities. In other words, the general type of 

 all so-called natural laws is known independently of the 

 amount of experience, and is only brought to consciousness 

 by experience, and it is only the empirical addenda to these 

 laws that are first " abstracted " from empirical singularities, 

 and after that serve to " explain ' these singularities. Not 

 only constants in their different specificities but also specific 



