256 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



8. SUBSTANCE AS A CATEGORY IX ITS RELATION TO 



ENTELECHY 



By proving that entelechy is not identical with or a 

 consequence of any chemical compound, or the constellation 

 of such compounds, we by no means have solved the chief 

 problem of our present chapter, which deals with the 

 relation between entelechy and substance as a category. 

 May not entelechy, though absolutely unlike everything 

 that can be called substance in the inorganic world 

 whether it be conceived purely chemically or in the sense 

 of a theory of matter- -may not entelechy be called a 

 " substance " in the most general philosophical sense of the 

 word, that is, in the sense of a something irreducible, which 

 remains the always unchangeable bearer of its changeable 

 qualities ? 



Then there would be two substances with regard to 

 nature, and our theory would become very similar to 

 some theories of the past, though with the remarkable 

 difference that our idealistic view would not allow us to 

 regard one of these two substances as " psychical," as all 

 other similar theories have done- -Lotze's being one of 

 the latest. There would be one spatially extended sub- 

 stance " matter " and one non-spatial intensive substance 

 -"entelechy' both substances forming part of that 

 branch of enlarged given reality called conceptual scien- 

 tific nature. 



Let us first note a few very characteristic features of 

 what may be called the behaviour of entelechies ; the 

 analysis may perhaps afford us materials to decide our 

 fundamental problem. 



