306 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



we enter upon the chief part of our whole bio-philosophical 

 system. 



We have learnt in a former chapter of these lectures 

 that entelechy, though not a substance in the proper mean- 

 ing of the word as used in the inorganic sciences, resembles 

 " substance ' : in so far as it endures in spite of changes ; 

 and we have also learnt that entelechy, though it is not 

 causality in the proper meaning of the word, resembles 

 causality in so far as it determines changes in nature with 

 univocal necessity. We may say that entelechy is causality 

 and substance, but that it is also something more, that 

 entelechy implies causality and substance, just as causality 

 implies substance because it cannot be thought of without 

 a bearer that endures in spite of all change. 



What then " is " entelechy categorically ? There seems 

 no place left for it, at least in the categorical system of 

 Kant, where so-called "interaction," u Wechselwirkung ' 

 in German, takes the third and last place among the 

 categories of relation. 



Introspective Psychology and the Categories of Substance 



and Causality 



In the first place, let us study a little more intimately 

 the way in which the categories of causality and substance 

 come to consciousness and acquire their bearing on science. 



Categories, we know, render " experience " possible with 

 regard to all that is given except themselves, they being 

 " experienced ' immediately and irreducibly during our 

 becoming conscious of Givenness. Categories, in other words, 

 create nature so far as the latter is a cosmos instead of a 

 chaos ; the cosmos is systematised in science. Categories are 



