THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY 321 



coherent aspect than it does under the views of orthodox 

 Kantiaris. 



With Kant, as with a Cartesian in this respect, nature 

 is only in space ; the " moral world " is a world by itself, 

 and life receives a very ambiguous position altogether. 

 The whole of Givenness is broken into two or even three 

 parts, and this is the more regrettable, because one part of 

 it, morality, is transferred to the sphere of voov^eva, or 

 intelligible things in the transcendent sense, the absolute 

 intellectual inaccessibility of which had been affirmed just 

 before ; and because a second part, life, is at least said to 

 be inaccessible to " science." Thus the three parts of 

 Givenness appear quite irreconcilable. 



In opposition to this Kantian doctrine it seems to me 

 that the concept of nature must be enlarged, so that 

 " nature," always in the sense of objectified Givenness, 

 consists of one completely spatial and one only partly 

 spatial portion. 1 The logical process, in fact, on the basis 

 of which the concept of a " force ' as an irreducible 



1 Only in this way, it seems to me, do the chapter of Kant's Kritik, 

 " Moglichkeit der Causalitat durch Freiheit, in Verbindung mit dem 

 allgemeinen Gesetze der Naturnotwendigkeit " and the " Erlauterung " 

 following this chapter, acquire a really clear meaning, even from the point 

 of view of the "analytical" part of the Kritik itself. Kant's "Freiheit" only 

 has an understandable sense if conceived as a non-mechanical and non- 

 spatial form of determinated and natural happening just like our entelechy. 

 Nothing metaphysical comes into account here as long as acting is studied 

 as an element in Givenness. As to "my" acting and "my" thinking 

 see page 304. That the so-called "antinomies" of Kant's " Dialektik " 

 are not really such, has often been noticed. All of them are capable of 

 being solved within the range of Givenness and do not touch at all the 

 problem of the "Absolute." Mind within the range of Givenness is more 

 perfect than Kant allowed it to be. Also the problem of the h'niteness 

 or infiniteness of the universe i.s very understandable and soluble within 

 Givenness, and does not perforce relate to something else. It was a mistake 

 of Kant to connect his " thing-in-itself " with all sorts of problems about 

 pure Givenness. 



21 



