328 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



us to predict the number of regular bodies and their 

 characteristics. Here we meet the problem of systematics 

 once more. 



No attempt has been made, so far, to answer the first 

 of these questions, except a few rather fanciful constructions 

 by the school of Schelling. In fact, it is difficult to see 

 what the ground of division for a system of entelechian 

 manifestations could be. It probably could only be gained 

 from introspective psychology, 1 from an analysis of different 

 types of volition ; but that would not go beyond mere 

 analogy at present. 



As to the second question, the problem " why ' these 

 very singularities are connected in one unity, it is here 

 that the third special kind of " explaining " above 

 mentioned comes into play. The old French morphologists, 

 Cuvier for instance, saw this problem ; only E. Kadi 2 has 

 seen it in our own day. It is the problem of necessary 

 but non-causal connexion, which also plays its role in 

 geometry, and in everything connected with geometry. 

 " Explaining " would occur here on the basis of the " Satz 

 vom Grunde des Seins ' in Schopenhauer's terminology. 

 But there exists not even an attempt at a solution of 

 this fundamental problem. 



A few aprioristic special statements with regard to 

 different forms of entelechian manifestation, though not 

 with regard to systematics, are indeed possible. It might, 



1 To a certain extent Bergson tries to derive the different types of organic 

 beings plants, echiuoderms and molluscs, arthropods, vertebrates from 

 the character of his supra-conscious elan vital. This common source would 

 also explain the harmonies among those types, especially that between 

 plants and animals in general. 



2 See in particular his Geschichte der biologischen Theorien, vol. i., Leipzig, 

 1905 ; vol. ii. in preparation. 



