THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY 357 



It is a very important and very strange characteristic 

 of the category of morality that it almost always appears in 

 the form of a negation. We judge that something " ought 

 not to happen," but it would in most cases though not in 

 all be very difficult for us to say with absolute certainty 

 what " ought to happen." l With regard to history in 

 particular, we therefore might say that there was a real 

 evolution in it if we were able to assert that the sum of 

 what ought not to happen becomes less during the historical 

 process in a not merely cumulative way. It is worth noticing 

 that not a word has been said about " freedom," " responsi- 

 bility," and such like in this short theory of morality. 



Morality relates to individuals and to individuals only.' 2 

 Historical cumulations of any kind therefore can be binding 

 in a moral sense only if what they ask does not contradict 

 the immediate relation of individual to individual. This is 

 very important in practical life. 



Morality and Vitalism 



We now come to a very important relation between 

 morality and all vitalism. 



The assertion of morality implies the assertion of entelechy, 

 just as entelechy implies causality and substance. 



It seems to me very important to realise that morality and 



correlate of supra-personal individuality, and not as a category for itself. 

 May we say perhaps that "morality" on its own part guarantees the supra-' 

 personal unity in history and culture that we are in search of (see p. 344 f.) ? 



1 But morality must have some sort of content. Mere "formal " morality, 

 like that of Kant, would be as valueless as a statement of the existence of 

 categories of "relation" which did not specify what they are. But a theory 

 of morality is not the business of this work. 



2 Let me add once more : not to individuals that form part of a higher 

 truly "individual" constellation, such as the State has been supposed to be. 

 In this case the individuals would only be means of the supra-individuum. 



