PART IV 



METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS 

 INTRODUCTORY KEMARKS 



OUR whole argument has rested so far upon pure idealistic 

 phenomenalism ; we have analysed the Given so far as it 

 certainly is my phenomenon. In this sense, forces and 

 entelechies were agents in nature as part of my Givenness, 

 they were concepts auxiliary to the understanding of 

 Givenness. 



Is there really no way to escape from phenomenalism to 

 something absolute, to " metaphysics," that is to say, to 

 something that is not exclusively " my phenomenon " ? And 

 what does all our argument amount to on a metaphysical 

 basis ? 



It seems to me that there are three possibilities, three 

 windows, as I might say though dim windows only- 

 through which at least we are able to see that there is such 

 a thing as absoluteness. 



By no means do I believe that I am able to " prove ' 

 absoluteness in the proper sense of the word. We cannot 

 " prove " the inconceivable. And absoluteness implies un- 

 intelligibility in the sense of provableness, otherwise it 

 would not be absoluteness but phenomenality. I know very 



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