368 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



it finds nothing to work with. It wants " means," and 

 matter including spatial causality is its means in the 

 manner we have described. Thus, in fact, as we have said, 

 individuality by no means destroys but implies causality; 

 it would be an impossibility without it ; it interferes or 

 has interfered with causality here and there, but not 

 everywhere. 



TJie Domain of Teleology 



At this point we shall apply our results about teleology 

 to what we have learnt about the Absolute. 



It was known already to Kant that our faculty of creating 

 a real " system >: of immediate phenomenological Givenness 

 proves a certain sort of correspondence between the active 

 and the passive part of experience, between categories or 

 rather " ontological prototypes " and sensible Givenness itself. 

 For sensible Givenness might be imagined to be such as not 

 to allow of any special order at all. In this case the mere 

 concept of univocal determination would be awaked by 

 experience in the mind, but there would not even be a field 

 of substance or causality, for causality or substance as 

 categories would not be awakened by a chaotic Givenness. 



But this most general question does not affect our 

 bio-theoretical problem as such. Let us therefore turn to a 

 narrower field of analysis. 



It would not be impossible to imagine a world in which 

 only the category of substance were applicable change 

 would be wanting in such a world. And it would not be 

 impossible to imagine a world deprived of entelechy but 

 endowed with causality there would be no organisms in 

 such a world ; the only realm of the category of individuality 



