METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS 371 



entelechy strictly separated, and whenever Givenness tended 

 to absoluteness, 1 absoluteness would do the same. It is 

 true that metaphysical assumptions about the unity of the 

 Ego might seem to guarantee us the possibility of " monism," 

 but as soon as the Ego becomes active, it evolves its unity 

 into manifoldness and therefore is unable to discover monism 

 anywhere. 



In the sense of a primary entelechy of order of constella- 

 tion in the world, as a S^/UCL^O? in opposition to mere 

 " material," the concept of God therefore appears as an 

 eternal task of science ; unintelligible in the last resort, as 

 all religions maintain, and only approachable by analogies, 

 like all absoluteness. For it only is through ground-glass 

 windows, as it were, that we are allowed to look into 

 absoluteness ; we only know the " fact ''' of the Absolute 

 absolutely ; whilst bound to our categorical system, we only 

 know quite vaguely the " how " of the Absolute. 



Thus " natural theology " is possible in the sense of a 

 scientific task, but in no other. There certainly is some- 

 thing that appears to us as reason in Givenness, viz. the 



1 To be quite clear : The problem of the contingency or non-contingency 

 or limited non-contingency of the universe, and further, the problem of the 

 primary entelechy in the universe, relate to G'ivenneas as a conceptual 

 phenomenon in the first place. In this field in opposition to Kant a clear 

 and satisfying solution of the problem is possible ; the Kantian "antinomies " 

 are immanent, and are probably soluble in the immanent field. It, of course, 

 is quite a different problem whether and how far the solution relates to any- 

 thing absolute. Or, to speak in (terms of theology : the physico-teleological 

 proof of God, or anything like a God, may be decisive with regard to God as an 

 entelechian factor in Givenness ; but it is quite another problem whether or 

 not the decision arrived at here relates to the Absolute. This then is the most 

 important thing : all the difficulties and obscurities with regard to the 

 Absolute are not proper to the problem of a "primary entelechy" r/.s xc7t, 

 but come upon the scene as soon as any attempt is made to refer any 

 characteristics of Givenness whatever to the absolute sphere. Comp. 

 page 321, note 1. 



