Sketch of an Organismal Theory of Consciousness 291 



comprehensible than are others. 



Chemically viewed the problem now on our hands is en- 

 tirely one of fact fact as determined by observation alone, 

 and by observation with the aid of experimentation. If it 

 can be shown that each individual conscious being really does 

 behave like a chemical substance in the process of reacting; 

 and if the result of such reaction can be shown to have even 

 one of the essential marks of a chemical product, both propo- 

 sitions of my two-parted hypothesis are warrantable and the 

 hypothesis becomes genuinely scientific a genuine "working 

 hypothesis" one, that is, for bio-chemistry to take seri- 

 ously. 



More Systematic Justification of the Hypothesis 



That the propositions are demonstrable to the extent of 

 the demand just indicated is my contention. This conten- 

 tion I will now try to make good and will begin with a few 

 remarks on a question concerning the hypothesis which 

 ought to arise instinctively in the mind of every one. That 

 question is : Does such a conception of psychic life and 1 con- 

 sciousness as that contained in our hypothesis imply any real 

 infringement upon or derogation from me, in the deepest 

 sense a real entity properly designated by the terms person 

 and personality? 



On saying that this query ought to arise mstinctively, I 

 do not mean ought in the ethical sense, but in the organismal 

 sense. That is, in a sense which implies that the very nature 

 of the conscious organism is that it is not only self-existent 

 in a measure like every natural object, but that it is self-iden- 

 tifiable, and within certain bounds, self-determinative of its 

 own acts. Now recognizing it to be thus by its "very na- 

 ture" is only another way of recognizing that it is so in its 

 instincts as well as in its physical organization. But since 

 instinct is more fundamental, more deep-rooted in the or- 



