Sketch of an Organismal Theory of Consciousness 299 



enclature for the subjective and objective sides of man's 

 psychic life is "Relations of Ideas" for the first, and "Mat- 

 ters of Fact' : for the second. Of the first kind says Hume, 

 "Are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra and Arithmetic ; and 

 in short, every affirmation which is intuitively or demonstra- 

 tively certain." . . . "That three* times five is equal to half 

 of thirty, 9 ' is a simple illustration of the relation of 

 ideas. And, "Propositions of this kind are dis- 

 coverable by the mere operation of thought, with- 

 out dependence on what is anywhere existent in the uni- 

 verse." 20 And further on, Part 2, same section, we read: 

 "It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a 

 great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only 

 the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while 

 she conceals from us those powers and principles on which 

 the influence of those objects entirely depends." Then Hume 

 goes into a discussion of the operations and relations of the 

 "superficial qualities" and "secret' 1 powers of objects which 

 is so similar to my treatment of the relation of the organism 

 to the attributes of certain objects (chapters 20 and 21 this 

 book, and, more particularly, my essay Is Nature Infinite? 21 ) 

 that it seems as though his words must have been in my mind 

 when I thought out what I have there written, though I cer- 

 tainly was not conscious of Hume's views. And this sub- 

 conscious influence appears the more probable in that I have 

 almost conclusive proof of having read his argument not long 

 before my own was written. I am certain, however, that if 

 his statements were in my mind they were only in its pro- 

 conscious part and were not nor ever had been in its full- 

 conscious part. In other words, if I had read his words I 

 had not grasped their full significance. This probable in- 

 stance of the "sub-' or "pro"-conscious I refer to not so 

 much because of its interest in this instance, as because of its 

 bearing on my conception of the nature of consciousness. 

 The discussion by Hume to which I refer is that in which he 



