Sketch of an Organismal Theory of Consciousness 285 



subject of instincts presents itself, represent the same num- 

 ber of valid departments of man's mental life. The point 

 I wish to make is that although a zoologist may recognize 

 without cavil that speculation on psychological, ethical, 

 and metaphysical problems which arise in connection with 

 instincts, are legitimate activities of man, and might prop- 

 erly deny that it is incumbent upon him to do much specu- 

 lating of this sort, yet it would be incumbent on him to take 

 due cognizance of these speculative attributes of the human 

 animal. A truly scientific zoology can not justify itself in 

 issuing a manifesto to the effect that certain attributes pre- 

 sented by some animals do not fall within its province. It 

 may more or less constantly neglect or refuse on practical 

 grounds, to deal with certain attributes ; but that is a very 

 different matter from a formal declaration such as many 

 present-day zoologists make, that with these attributes 

 zoology has nothing to do. Such a declaration is self-stunt- 

 ing, if not self-stultifying, in that it is a virtual self-inhi- 

 bition by zoology of its own growth. 



These reflections may be terminated by defining the mo- 

 tives and the mental attitude with which I approach the 

 great problem of consciousness. I come to it not as a meta- 

 physician, not as a psychologist, not as a physiologist, not 

 even as an anthropologist, but as an anthropological zoolo- 

 gist ; as a zoologist who in course of his regular professional 

 work takes up the animal group of which he himself is a mem- 

 ber, chancing as he does to possess among other attributes 

 that of knowing his own life directly, that is, through sub- 

 jective or self-conscious experience, as well as indirectly 

 through objective experience. 



Approaching the problem of consciousness in such an at- 

 titude and for such a motive, it is impossible to view it other- 

 wise than as one aspect of the larger problem of life gener- 

 ally. For while the psychologically and metaphysically im- 

 portant question of whether consciousness is coextensive 



