Sketch of an Organismal Theory of Consciousness 293 



existent for one alone. This constitutes the very conception 

 of the difference between 'inner' psychical or mental, and 

 physical or 'outer' facts." 4 



Ever-present, and obvious as is the comparison here made, 

 it nevertheless is of so great importance that we must stop 

 and reflect upon it, for we shall surely fail to grasp the full 

 measure of what is to follow if we are lukewarm toward one 

 of the elements of it. The element I refer to is the unique- 

 ness, the essentially personal character of inner as contrast- 

 ed with outer facts. Every normal person is ready enough 

 to insist that his thoughts, his feelings, his emotions and all 

 the rest of his higher psychical experiences are his and his 

 alone. The tremendous reality and force of the rights of 

 "private opinion," of "personal conscience" and so forth, 

 among civilized men, hardly need to be expatiated on. 



The character of the uniqueness of these experiences, how- 

 ever, concerns practical living less vitally, so we give it less 

 attention. The whole vast range of my mental life, from 

 the lowest, simplest, vaguest sensations to the highest, most 

 bewildering complex emotions, passions, imaginings and 

 thoughts, are my own, absolutely, so far as other persons 

 are concerned. I cannot share them to the least extent with 

 another person. Of course I can let others, especially my 

 most intimate associates, my dearest friends, know a good 

 deal about these experiences of mine. But after all, gladly 

 as I would share many of them with these friends, it is utter- 

 ly impossible for me to do so. My experiences must remain 

 wholly outside of their consciousness. No two persons can 

 have the same experience any more than they can have the 

 same hands or stomachs. Nor is this all. If mental life is 

 subject to the general biological laws of variation into which 

 we have latterly gained much insight, I am obliged to sup- 

 pose that these experiences of mine, the whole retinue of sen- 

 sations, feelings, emotions and thoughts, differ somewhat 

 from the corresponding experiences of other persons. And 



