Evolutionism and Systematism 457 



more importance and which epistemology generally overlooks. If 

 new variations can arise, not only in organic but perhaps also in 

 inorganic nature, new tasks are placed before the human mind. The 

 question is, then, if it has forms in which there is room for the new 

 matter? We are here touching a possibility which the great master 

 of epistemology did not bring to light. Kant supposed confidently 

 that no other matter of knowledge could stream forth from the dark 

 source which he called "the thing-in-itself," than such as could be 

 synthesised in our existing forms of knowledge. He mentions the 

 possibility of other forms than the human, and warns us against the 

 dogmatic assumption that the human conception of existence should 

 be absolutely adequate. But he seems to be quite sure that the 

 thing-in-itself works constantly, and consequently always gives us 

 only what our powers can master. This assumption was a con- 

 sequence of Kant's rationalistic tendency, but one for which no 

 warrant can be given. Evolutionism and systematism are opposing 

 tendencies which can never be absolutely harmonised one with the 

 other. Evolution may at any time break some form which the 

 system-monger regards as finally established. Darwin himself felt a 

 great difference in looking at variation as an evolutionist and as 

 a systematist. When he was working at his evolution theory, he 

 was very glad to find variations ; but they were a hindrance to him 

 when he worked as a systematist, in preparing his work on Cirri- 

 pedia. He says in a letter: "I had thought the same parts of the 

 same species more resemble (than they do anyhow in Cirripedia) 

 objects cast in the same mould. Systematic work would be easy 

 were it not for this confounded variation, which, however, is pleasant 

 to me as a speculatist, though odious to me as a systematist 1 ." He 

 could indeed be angry with variations even as an evolutionist ; but 

 then only because he could not explain them, not because he could 

 not classify them. " If, as I must think, external conditions produce 

 little direct effect, what the devil determines each particular varia- 

 tion 2 ?" What Darwin experienced in his particular domain holds 

 good of all knowledge. All knowledge is systematic, in so far as it 

 strives to put phenomena in quite definite relations, one to another. 

 But the systematisation can never be complete. And here Darwin 

 has contributed much to widen the world for us. He has shown us 

 forces and tendencies in nature which make absolute systems im- 

 possible, at the same time that they give us new objects and 

 problems. There is still a place for what Lessing called "the 

 unceasing striving after truth," while " absolute truth " (in the sense 

 of a closed system) is unattainable so long as life and experience 

 are going on. 



1 Life and Letters, Vol. n. p. 37. 2 Ibid. p. 232. 



