166 THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 



the chemical molecule possesses cannot be applied 

 to the organism. Any definition that involves the 

 idea of materiality fails. Obviously the notion of the 

 individual most commonly met with in zoological 

 writings that it is the product of the development 

 of a single ovum fails, for, logically applied, it would 

 regard the entire progeny of the ovum, that is, all the 

 organisms belonging to the species, as the individual. 

 It is clear that the difficulties of the concept arise 

 from our attempt to identify the life of the organism 

 with the material constellation in which this life is 

 manifested. In the course of generation after genera- 

 tion the ovum becomes divided and grows and is 

 again divided, and so on without apparent limit. 

 But if we assume that the ' organisation ' or ' en- 

 telechy ' is material and is capable of this infinite 

 divisibility without impairment of its attributes, do 

 we not extend to matter a property which belongs 

 only to the concepts dealt with by mathematics ? 



The discussion of individuality with regard to the 

 organism, considered as a morphological entity, is, 

 indeed, rather a formal one, and it is valuable only 

 in so far as it has for its object the establishment of 

 the most convenient terminology. Nevertheless, the 

 notion of organic individuality is clear to us though 

 it is a notion felt intuitively and incapable of analysis. 

 We see in nature animals like ourselves, and we do 

 not doubt that each of them is an entity isolated from 

 the rest of the universe, and to which the rest of 

 the universe is relative. We ourselves are primarily 

 centres of action. Motion, or change of position 

 with respect to some object apart from ourselves in 

 nature, is only relative, and there is no standard or 

 point in the universe which is motionless and to which 

 we can refer the motion of a body apart from our 



