PRINCIPLES, CANONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 39 



REMARKS. In consequence of the frequent subversion of long-current 

 and familiar names rendered necessary under the inflexible action of the lex 

 prioritatis, through the discovery of some long-forgotten work in which 

 occur names of earlier date than those currently in use for certain species, it 

 has been repeatedly suggested by various writers that a ' statute of limita- 

 tion,' in modification of the lex prioritatis, which should forever suppress 

 and render ineligible names found in early and long-forgotten works, or 

 names which for any reason have been for a considerable period overlooked, 

 would prove a help towards securing stability in nomenclature. If such an 

 end could be attained it would certainly prove a boon, and the importance of 

 the proposition has led your Committee to give it attentive consideration. 

 Having therefore considered the proposition in all its bearings, your Com- 

 mittee feels called upon in this connection to record its conviction that 

 such a statute is inadmissible, for the following reasons. The proposition, 

 as generally stated (see DALL, Rep., p. 47), is to the effect that a name 

 which has not been in use for a period of twenty-five years (or whatever 

 period may be agreed upon) shall be thereafter excluded from use in that 

 special connection, or, alternatively, that a name which has been universally, 

 or even generally, adopted for a like period cannot be displaced for an earlier 

 obscure name. The insuperable objection to any rule of this character is 

 its vagueness and the uncertainty of its applicability, arising from the diffi- 

 culty of absolutely determining that a name has not been in use for a given 

 period, or whether another name has been universally used, or what shall be 

 taken as 'current' or 'general,' in case anything short of 'universal ' be 

 allowed. Unless perfect agreement could be obtained, and of this there is 

 very little probability, the proposed rule would tend to increase rather than 

 lessen the confusion it would be the design to remove. As regards obsolete 

 or forgotten works, others equally troublesome might be found to have 

 escaped the operation of such a rule, in consequence of their date of publica- 

 tion falling just outside the period of limitation. Again, it might be difficult 

 to decide whether or not a somewhat obsolete and more or less forgot- 

 ten work was sufficiently obsolete to be set aside. Furthermore, it some- 

 times happens that certain names may be current among writers of one 

 'school' or nationality, which are rejected by those of other schools or nation- 

 alities ; while in other cases it might be difficult to decide whether a more 

 or less well known name had really sufficient currency to retain its place 

 against an earlier less known but strictly tenable name. In some cases, of 

 course, there would be no uncertainty as to the currency of a name under 

 question, but in many such doubt would arise, and unanimity of opinion and 

 practice in such case would be hopeless. 



The 'statute of limitation' principle is akin to the auctoruin plurimo- 

 rnm rule ; both are Utopian, and both radically set at defiance the lex 

 prioritatis. 



