368 ESSAY ON CLASSIFICATION. 



to the species, to separate at once from one another any 

 types which exhibit marked differences, without even 

 inquiring first whether these differences are of a kind 

 that justifies such separations. In our systems, the quan- 

 titative element of differentiation prevails too exclusively 

 over the qualitative. If such distinctions are introduced 

 under well-sounding names, they are almost certain to be 

 adopted; as if science gained any thing by concealing a 

 difficulty under a Latin or Greek name, or was advanced 

 by the additional burden of a new nomenclature! Ano- 

 ther objectionable practice, prevailing quite as extensively 

 also, consists in the change of names, or the modification 

 of the extent and meaning of old ones, without the addi- 

 tion of new information or of new views. If this practice is 

 not abandoned, it will necessarily end in making Natural 

 History a mere matter of nomenclature, instead of foster- 

 ing its higher philosophical character. Nowhere is this 

 abuse of a useless multiplication of names so keenly felt 

 as in the nomenclature of the fruits of plants, which 

 exhibits neither insight into vegetable morphology, nor 

 even accurate observation of the material facts. 



May we not rather return to the methods of such men 

 as Cuvier and Baer, who were never ashamed of express- 

 ing their doubts in difficult cases, and were always ready 

 to call the attention of other observers to questionable 

 points, instead of covering up the deficiency of their 

 information by high-sounding words ? 



In this rapid review of the history of Zoology, I have 

 omitted several classifications, such as those of Kaup and 

 Van der Hoeven, which might have afforded an oppor- 

 tunity for other remarks ; but I have already extended this 

 digression far enough to show how the standards Avhich I 

 have proposed in my second chapter may assist us in 



