THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS 



BY ALEXANDER T. ORMOND 



[Alexander Thomas Ormond, McCosh Professor of Philosophy, Princeton 

 University, since 1897. b. 1847, Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Mental 

 Science Fellow, Princeton, 1877-78; Post-grad. Bonn and' Berlin, 1884-85; 

 Ph.D. Princeton,"! 880; A.B. ibid. 1877; LL.D. Miami, 1899. Professor of 

 Philosophy and History, University of Minnesota, 1880-83; Professor of 

 Mental Science and Logic, Princeton University, 1883-97. Member Ameri- 

 can Philosophical Association, American Psychological Association.] 



I 

 THE PRELIMINARY QUESTION 



THE living problems of any science arise out of two sources : (1) out 

 of what men may think of it, in view of its nature and claims, and 

 (2) the problems that at any period are vital to it, and in the solution 

 of which it realizes the purpose of its existence. Now if we distinguish 

 the body of the sciences which deal with aspects of the world's phenom- 

 ena and here I would include both the psychic and the physical - 

 from metaphj'sics, which professes to go behind the phenomenon and 

 determine the world in terms of its inner, and, therefore, ultimate real- 

 ity, it may be truly said of the body of the sciences that they are in a 

 position to disregard in a great measure questions that arise out of the 

 first source, inasmuch as the data from which they make their de- 

 parture are obvious to common observation. Our world is all around 

 us, and its phenomena either press upon us or are patent to our 

 observation. Lying thus within the field of observation, it does 

 not occur to the average mind to question either the legitimacy or 

 the possibility of that effort of reflection which is devoted to their 

 investigation and interpretation. Metaphysics, however, enjoys no 

 such immunity as this, but its claims are liable to be met with skep- 

 ticism or denial at the outset, and this is due partly to the nature of 

 its initial claims, and partly to the fact that its real data are less open 

 to observation than are those of the sciences. I say partly to the 

 nature of the initial claims of metaphysics, for it is characteristic of. 

 metaphysics that it refuses to regard the distinction between phe- 

 nomena and ground or inner nature, on which the sciences rest, as 

 final, and is committed from the outset to the claim that the real is 

 in its inner nature one and to be interpreted in the light of, or in 

 terms of, its inner unity; whereas, science has so indoctrinated the 

 modern mind with the supposition that only the outer movements 

 of things are open to knowledge, while their inner and real nature 

 must forever remain inaccessible to our powers; I say that the mod- 



