302 LOGIC 



forms of knowing. Logic he divides into dialectic and technical 

 logic. The former regards the idea of knowledge as such; the formal 

 or technical regards knowledge in the process of becoming or the 

 idea of knowledge in motion. The forms of this process are induction 

 and deduction. The Hegelian theory of the generation of knowledge 

 out of the processes of pure thought is emphatically rejected. 



Lotze, who is undoubtedly one of the most influential and fruitful 

 writers on logic in the last century, attempts to bring logic into 

 closer relations with contemporary science, and is an antagonist of 

 one-sided formal logics. For him logic falls into the three parts of 

 (1) pure logic or the logic of thought; (2) applied logic or the logic 

 of investigation; (3) the logic of knowledge or methodology; and this 

 classification of the matter and problems of logic has had an im- 

 portant influence on subsequent treatises on the discipline. His 

 logic is formal, as he describes it himself, in the sense of setting forth 

 the modes of the operation of thought and its logical structure; it is 

 real in the sense that these forms are dependent on the nature of 

 things and not something independently given in the mind. While 

 he aims to maintain the distinct separation of logic and metaphysics, 

 he says (in the discussion of the relations between formal and real 

 logical meaning) the question of meaning naturally raises a meta- 

 physical problem: " Ich thue besser der Metaphysik die weitere 

 Erorterung dieses wichtigen Punktes zu iiberlassen." (Log. 2d ed. 

 p. 571.) How could it be otherwise when his whole view of the rela- 

 tions and validity of knowledge is inseparable from his realism or 

 teleological idealism, as he himself characterizes his own standpoint? 



Drobisch, a follower of Herbart, is one of the most thoroughgoing 

 formalists in modern logical theory. He attempts to maintain strictly 

 the distinction between thought and knowledge. Logic is the science 

 of thought. He holds that there may be formal truth, for example, 

 logically valid truth, which is materially false. Logic, in other words, 

 is purely formal; material truth is matter for metaphysics or science. 

 Drobisch holds, therefore, that the falsity of the judgment expressed 

 in the premise from which a formally correct syllogism may be deduced, 

 is not subject-matter for logic. The sphere of logic is limited to the 

 region of inference and forms of procedure, his view of the nature 

 and function of logic being determined largely by the bias of his 

 mathematical standpoint. The congruity of thought with itself, 

 judgments, conclusions, analyses, etc., is the sole logical truth, as 

 against Trendelenburg, who took the Aristotelian position that log- 

 ical truth is the "agreement of thought with the object of thought." 



Sigwart looks at logic mainly from the standpoint of the tech- 

 nology of science, in which, however, he discovers the implications 

 of a teleological metaphysic. Between the processes of conscious- 

 ness and external changes he finds a causal relation and not parallel- 



