304 LOGIC 



standpoint of Wundt is similar to that of Sigwart, in that he dis- 

 covers the function of logic in the exposition of the formation and 

 methods of scientific knowledge; for example, in epistemology and 

 methodology. Logic must conform to the conditions under which 

 scientific inquiry is actually carried on; the forms of thought, 

 therefore, cannot be separate from or indifferent to the content of 

 knowledge; for it is a fundamental principle of science that its 

 particular methods are determined by the nature of its particular 

 subject-matter. Scientific logic must reject the theory that identifies 

 thought and being (Hegel) and the theory of parallelism between 

 thought and reality (Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg, and Ueberweg), 

 in which the ultimate identity of the two is only concealed. Both 

 of these theories base logic on a metaphysics, which makes it nec- 

 essary to construe the real in terms of thought, and logic, so di- 

 vorced from empirical reality, is powerless to explain the methods of 

 scientific procedure. One cannot, however, avoid the acceptance of 

 thought as a competent organ for the interpretation of reality, unless 

 one abandons all question of validity and accepts agnosticism or 

 skepticism. This interpretative power of thought or congruity with 

 reality is translated by metaphysical logic into identity. Metaphysical 

 logic concerns itself fundamentally with the content of knowledge, not 

 with its evidential or formal logical aspects, but with being and the 

 laws of being. It is the business of metaphysics to construct its 

 notions and theories of reality out of the deliverances of the special 

 sciences and inferences derived therefrom. The aim of metaphysics 

 is the development of a world-view free from internal contradictions, 

 a view that shall unite all particular and plural knowledges into a 

 whole. Logic stands in more intimate relation to the special sciences, 

 for here the relations are reciprocal and immediate; for example, 

 from actual scientific procedure logic abstracts its general laws and 

 results, and these in turn it delivers to the sciences as their formu- 

 lated methodology. In the history of science the winning of know- 

 ledge precedes the formulation of the rules employed, that is, pre- 

 cedes any scientific methodology. Logic, as methodology, is not an 

 a priori construction, but has its genesis in the growth of science 

 itself and in the discovery of those tests and criteria of truth which 

 are found to possess an actual heuristic or evidential value. It is 

 not practicable to separate epistemology and logic, for such con- 

 cepts as causality, analogy, validity, etc., are fundamental in logical 

 method, and yet they belong to the territory of epistemology, are 

 epistemological in nature, as one may indeed say of all the general 

 laws of thought. A formal logic that is merely propaedeutic , a logic that 

 aims to free itself from the quarrels of epistemology, is scientifically 

 useless. Its norms are valueless, in so far as they can only teach the 

 arrangement of knowledge already possessed, and teach nothing as to 



