RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES 305 



how to secure it or test its real validity. While formal logic aims to 

 put itself outside of philosophy, metaphysical logic would usurp 

 the place of philosophy. Formal logic is inadequate, because it 

 neither shows how the laws of thought originate, why they are 

 valid, nor in what sense they are applicable to concrete investigation. 

 Wundt, therefore, develops a logic which one may call epistemo- 

 logical methodological, and which stands between the extremes of 

 formal logic and metaphysical logic. The laws of logic must be 

 derived from the processes of psychic experience and the procedure 

 of the sciences. "Logic therefore needs," as he says, "epistemology 

 for its foundation and the doctrine of methods for its completion." 



Lipps takes the view outright that logic is a branch of psychology; 

 Husserl in his latest book goes to the other extreme of a purely 

 formal and technical logic, and devotes almost his entire first volume 

 to the complete sundering of psychology and logic. 



Bradley bases his logic on the theory of the judgment. The logical 

 judgment is entirely different from the psychological. The logical 

 judgment is a qualification of reality by means of an idea. The 

 predicate is an adjective or attribute which in the judgment is 

 ascribed to reality. The aim of truth is to qualify reality by general 

 notions. But inasmuch as reality is individual and self-existent, 

 whereas truth is universal, truth and reality are not coincident. 

 Bradley 's metaphysical solution of the disparity between thought 

 and reality is put forward in his theory of the unitary Absolute, 

 whose concrete content is the totality of experience. But as thought 

 is not the whole of experience, judgments cannot compass the whole 

 of reality. Bosanquet objects to this, and maintains that reality must 

 not be regarded as an ideal construction. The real world is the world to 

 which our concepts and judgments refer. In the former we have a 

 world of isolated individuals of definite content; in the latter, we have 

 a world of definitely systematized and organized content. Under the 

 title of the Morphology of Knowledge Bosanquet considers the evo- 

 lution of judgment and inference in their varied forms. " Logic starts 

 from the individual mind, as that within which we have the actual 

 facts of intelligence, which we are attempting to interpret into a sys- 

 tem " (Logic, vol. i, p. 247). The real world for every individual is his 

 world. " The work of intellectually constituting that totality which 

 we call the real world is the work of knowledge. The work of analyz- 

 ing the process of this constitution or determination is the work of 

 logic, which might be described ... as the reflection of knowledge 

 upon itself " (Logic, vol. i, p. 3). " The relation of logic to truth con- 

 sists in examining the characteristics by which the various phases 

 of the one intellectual function are fitted for their place in the 

 intellectual totality which constitutes knowledge " (ibid.). The real 

 world is the intelligible world; reality is something to which we attain 



