306 LOGIC 



by a constructive process. We have here a type of logic which is 

 essentially a metaphysic. Indeed, Bosanquet says in the course of his 

 first volume: "I entertain no doubt that in content logic is one with 

 metaphysics, and differs, if at all, simply in mode of treatment --in 

 tracing the evolution of knowledge in the light of its value and import, 

 instead of attempting to summarize its value and import apart from 

 the details of its evolution " (Logic, vol. i, 247). 



Dewey (Studies in Logical Theory, p. 5) describes the essential 

 function of logic as the inquiry into the relations of thought as such 

 to reality as such. Although such an inquiry may involve the investi- 

 gation of psychological processes and of the concrete methods of 

 science and verification, a description and analysis of the forms of 

 thought, conception, judgment, and inference, yet its concern with 

 these is subordinate to its main concern, namely, the relation of 

 "thought at large to reality at large." Logic is not reflection on 

 thought, either on its nature as such or on its forms, but on its relations 

 to the real. In Dewey's philosophy, logical theory is a description of 

 thought as a mode of adaptation to its own conditions, and validity 

 is judged in terms of the efficiency of thought in the solution of its 

 own problems and difficulties. The problem of logic is more than 

 epistemological. Wherever there is striving there are obstacles ; and 

 wherever there is thinking there is a " material-in-question." Dewey's 

 logic is a theory of reflective experience regarded functionally, or 

 a pragmatic view of the discipline. This logic of experience aims to 

 evaluate the significance of social research, psychology, fine and in- 

 dustrial art, and religious aspiration in the form of scientific statement, 

 and to accomplish for social values in general what the physical 

 sciences have done for the physical world. In Dewey's teleological 

 pragmatic logic the judgment is essentially instrumental, the whole 

 of thinking is functional, and the meaning of things is identical 

 with valid meaning (Studies in Logical Theory, cf. pp. 48, 82, 128). 

 The real world is not a self-existent world outside of knowledge, but 

 simply the totality of experience; and experience is a complex of 

 strains, tensions, checks, and attitudes. The function of logic is the 

 redintegration of this experience. " Thinking is adaptation to an end 

 through the adjustment of particular objective contents ' (ibid. 

 p. 81). Logic here becomes a large part, if not the whole, of a meta- 

 physics of experience; its nature and function are entirely determined 

 by the theory of reality. 



In this brief and fragmentary resume are exhibited certain charac- 

 teristic movements in the development of logical theory, the construc- 

 tion put upon its subject-matter and its relation to other disciplines. 

 The resume has had in view only the making of the diversity of 

 opinion on these questions historically salient. There are three 

 distinct types of logic noticed here: (1) formal, whose concern is 



