412 ETHICS 



of solving the great problems of life cannot be the standard for me 

 save in the sense that I receive them into my will, recognize them as 

 valid for my own life. 



So, then, the whole weight of the distinction, the whole moral 

 process, is transferred to the individual. He is the point of depart- 

 ure and the goal of the struggle for a content in life. Is this now 

 egoism? This much-discussed question also suffers, as I believe, by 

 a defect in the statement of the problem. If it is intended that that 

 action is meant by egoism, the motive for which is one's own welfare 

 or happiness, by altruism, however, the action which aims at the 

 happiness of others, it is quite clear that these two contrasts have as 

 little meaning for the ethics of disposition as the complementary 

 contrast of beautiful and ugly. Moral action is completely indifferent 

 with regard to these contrasts. Moral actions can be characterized 

 as altruistic as well as egoistic, and the same is the case for unmoral 

 or bad actions. By knowing that distinct advantages have resulted 

 to the doer from an action, or that "the greatest happiness of the 

 greatest number" has resulted from it, I have not gained one step 

 for the moral valuation of this action. I should surely act immorally 

 if I omitted an action acknowledged as moral by me because it 

 would involve pain for others and thus would have an anti-altruistic 

 character. Whence this confusion of the altruistic with the moral 

 arose is easy to see. Long before the child could himself act morally, 

 it must be accustomed to feel that its beloved self cannot be the sole 

 standard for its action; and to the end that it keep peace and content 

 with its brothers and playmates, it is properly accustomed to regard 

 in its action the welfare of the human beings about it. That is a 

 preparatory step to moral action; but, strictly speaking, it can be 

 counted as moral by those only who are determined not to recognize 

 the limits between psychological motivation and normative deter- 

 mination. 



It would be an interesting task to trace the relations into which 

 the autonomous moral individual enters with the great moral 

 institutions which dominate the community and have combined in 

 usage, society, and state, and which Hegel described in a happy 

 expression as " objective morality." Here it is no longer the regard 

 for the weal or woe of fellow men which strives to gain influence 

 over my action; here the ethical will of past generations of my own 

 ancestors accosts and asks me whether I can bring my action into 

 harmony with that which they willed and for which they strove. 

 It is a slight disadvantage to the ethically directed man that, in 

 order to protect these moral institutions from injury, an arsenal 

 of punishments, of social influences, of boycotts, and of whatever 

 finer or coarser means of compulsion there may be, are set up. This 

 arsenal is necessary to sustain the social structure which alone 



