THE RELATIONS OF .ESTHETICS 421 



selves, are not ones upon which we can afford to rest: for clearly 

 they apply in very many cases where beauty does not claim sway. 



Our whole mental life exemplifies the unification of the manifold, 

 and monarchic subordination, whether the processes be aesthetic or 

 not. It does not suffice us to show, what is thus shown, that the 

 aesthetic states conform with conditions of our mental life that 

 have a broad significance, although it is of great importance to 

 demonstrate the fact: for our mental functioning in the apprecia- 

 tion of beauty appears thus as in truth an important type, but 

 for all that but a special and peculiar type of the functioning which 

 we thus bring into prominence. 



The problem then remains, what is the special nature of this 

 functioning which yields to us the sense of beauty? 



And here in my view we have the problem which is of prime 

 importance to aesthetics to-day, and which psychology alone can 

 answer; namely, what is the characteristic that differentiates the 

 sense of beauty from all other of our mental states? Until this 

 question is answered, all else must seem of secondary importance 

 from the standpoint of theoretical psychology, however important 

 other forms of inquiry may be from a practical point of view. 



When the psychologist turns his attention to this problem, he 

 at once perceives that he is unable to limit his inquiry to the experi- 

 ence of the technically trained artist, or even to that of the man of 

 culture who gives close attention to aesthetic appreciation. 



Beauty is experienced by all men. But beauty is very clearly of 

 varied types, and the sense of beauty is evidently called out by 

 impressions of most varied nature; but the fields of what is considered 

 beautiful by different people so far overlap that we can rest assured 

 that we all refer to an experience of the same characteristic mental 

 state when we proclaim the existence of beauty; for when we by 

 general agreement use a special term as descriptive of an objective 

 impression, we do so because this impression excites in us certain 

 more or less specific mental states; and when different people use 

 the same term in reference to objects of diverse nature, we are wont 

 to assume, and are in general correct in assuming, that these objects 

 affect these different people in approximately the same way. 



It seems probable, therefore, that if the child, who has learned how 

 to apply words from his elders, speaks of having a beautiful time at 

 his birthday party ; and if the grown man speaks of a beautiful day ; 

 and if the pathologist speaks of his preparation of morbid tissue as 

 beautiful; and if the artist or connoisseur speaks of the beauty of 

 a picture, a statue, a w r ork of architecture, a poem, a symphony; 

 then the word beauty must be used to describe a certain special mental 

 state which is aroused in different people by very diverse objective 

 impressions. 



