252 METAPHYSICS 



and reality in which the processes take the purposive form. In view of 

 this, the important steps of method (and we use the term method here 

 in the most fundamental sense) will be (1) the question of the form of 

 metaphysical activity or agency as contrasted with that of the phys- 

 ical sciences. This may be brought out in the contrast of the two 

 terms finality and mere efficiency, in which by mere efficiency is 

 meant an agency that is presumed to be thoughtless and purposeless, 

 and consequently without foresight. All this is embodied in the term 

 force or physical energy, and less explicitly in that of natural causa- 

 tion. Contrasted with this, finality is a term that involves the for- 

 ward impulse of idea, prevision, and purpose. Anything that is cap- 

 able of any sort of foretaste has in it a principle of prevision, selection, 

 choice, and purpose. The impulse that motives and runs it, that also 

 stands out as the end of its fulfillment, is a foretaste, an Ahnung, an 

 anticipation, and the whole process or movement, as well as every 

 part of it, will take on this character. (2) The second question of 

 method will be that of the nature of this category of which finality 

 is the form. What is its content, pure idea or pure will, or a synthesis 

 that includes both? We have here the three alternatives of pure 

 rationalism, voluntarism, and a doctrine hard to characterize in a 

 single word; that rests on a synthesis of the norms of both rational- 

 ism and voluntarism. Without debating these alternatives, I propose 

 here briefly to characterize the synthetic concept as supplying what 

 I conceive to be the most satisfactory doctrine. The principle of pure 

 rationalism is one of insight but is lacking in practical energy, 

 whereas, that of voluntarism supplies practical energy, but is lacking 

 in insight. Pure voluntarism is blind, while pure rationalism is power- 

 less. But the synthesis of idea and will, provided we go a step further 

 (as I think we must) and presuppose also a germ of feeling as interest, 

 supplies both insight and energy. So that the spring out of which our 

 world is to arise may be described as either the idea informed with 

 purposive energy, or purpose or will informed and guided by the idea. It 

 makes no difference which form of conception we use. In either case 

 if we include feeling as interest we are able to conceive movements 

 originating in some species of apprehension, taking the dynamic 

 form of purpose, and motived and selected, so to speak, by interest; 

 and in describing such activity we are simply describing these normal 

 movements of consciousness with which our experience makes us 

 most familiar. (3) The third question of method involves the relation 

 or correlation of the metaphysical interpretation with that of the 

 natural or physical science. Two points are fundamental here. In the 

 first place, it must be borne in mind that it is the same world with 

 which the plain man, the man of science, and the metaphysician are 

 concerned. We cannot partition off the external world to the plain 

 man, the atoms and ethers to the man of science, leaving the meta- 



