256 METAPHYSICS 



And here we come upon the last question in this field, that of the 

 ultimate being of the world. We have already concluded that the 

 real is in the last analysis rational. But we have not answered the 

 question whether there shall be one rational or many. Now it has 

 become clear that Avith metaphysics unity is a cardinal interest; 

 that, therefore, the world must be one in thought, purpose, aim. 

 And it is on this insight that the metaphysical doctrine of the ab- 

 solute rests. There must be one being whose thought and purpose are 

 all-inclusive, in order that the world may be one and that it may 

 have meaning as a whole. But the world presents itself as a plurality 

 of finite existents which our metaphysics requires us to reduce in the 

 last analysis to the psychic type. What of this plurality of psychic 

 existents? It is on this basis that metaphysics constructs its doctrine 

 of individuality. Allowing for latitude of opinion here, the trend 

 of metaphysical reflection sets strongly toward a doctrine of reality 

 that grounds the world in an Absolute whose all-comprehending 

 thought and purpose utters or realizes itself in the plurality of finite 

 individuals that constitutes the world; the degree of reality that 

 shall be ascribed to the plurality of individuals being a point in 

 debate, giving rise to the contemporary form of the issue between 

 idealism and realism. Allowing for minor differences, however, 

 there is among metaphysicians a fair degree of assent to the doctrine 

 that in order to be completely rational the world of individual plural- 

 ity must be regarded as implying an Absolute, which, whether it is 

 to be conceived as an individual or not, is the author and bearer of 

 the thought and design of the world as a whole. 



QUESTIONS OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ULTIMATE CRITERIA 



OF TRUTH 



We have only time to speak very briefly, in conclusion, of two 

 vital problems in metaphysics: (1) that of the nature and limits of 

 metaphysical knowledge ; (2) that of the ultimate criteria of truth. In 

 regard to the question of knowledge, we may either identify thought 

 with reality, or we may regard thought as wholly inadequate to repre- 

 sent the real; in one case we will be gnostic, in the other agnostic. 

 Now whatever may be urged in favor of the gnostic alternative, it 

 remains true that our thought, in order to follow along intelligible 

 lines, must be guided by the categories and analogies of our own 

 experience. This fixes a limit, so that the thought of man is never in 

 a position to grasp the real completely. Again, whatever may be 

 urged in behalf of the agnostic alternative, it is to be borne in mind 

 that our experience does supply us with intelligible types and cate- 

 gories ; and that under the impulse of the infinite and absolute, or 



