RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES 301 



in nominalism is equivalent (the accepted dogma of the Church be- 

 ing axiomatic) to reductio ad absurdum. A use of logic such as this, 

 tending to conserve rather than to increase the body of knowledge, 

 was bound to meet with attack on the awakening of post-renaissance 

 interest in the physical world, and the acquirement of a body of truth 

 to which the scholastic formal logic had no relation. The anti-scholas- 

 tic movement in logic was inaugurated by Francis Bacon, who 

 sought in his Novum Organum to give science a real content through 

 the application of induction to experience and the discovery of 

 universal truths from particular instances. The syllogism is rejected 

 as a scientific instrument, because it does not lead to principles, but 

 proceeds only from principles, and is therefore not useful for dis- 

 covery. It permits at most only refinements on knowledge already 

 possessed, but cannot be regarded as creative or productive. The 

 Baconian theory of induction regarded the accumulation of facts 

 and the derivation of general principles and laws from them as the 

 true and fruitful method of science. In England this empirical view 

 of logic has been altogether dominant, and the most illustrious Eng- 

 lish exponents of logical theory, Herschel, Whewell, and Mill, 

 have stood on that ground. Since the introduction of German 

 idealism in the last half century a new logic has grown up whose 

 chief business is with the theory of knowledge. 



Kant's departure in logic is based on an epistemological examin- 

 ation of the nature of judgment, and on the answer to his own 

 question, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" The 

 a priori elements in knowledge make knowledge of the real nature of 

 things impossible. Human knowledge extends to the phenomenal 

 world, which is seen under the a priori forms of the understanding. 

 Logic for Kant is the science of the formal and necessary laws of 

 thought, apart from any reference to objects. Pure or universal 

 logic aims to understand the forms of thought without regard to meta- 

 physical or psychological relations, and this position of Kant is the 

 historical beginning of the subjective formal logic. 



In the metaphysical logic of Hegel, which rests on a panlogistic 

 basis, being and thought, form and content, are identical. Logical 

 necessity is the measure and criterion of objective reality. The body 

 of reality is developed through the dialectic self-movement of the 

 idea. In such an idealistic monism, formal and real logic are by the 

 metaphysical postulate coincident. 



Schleiermacher in his dialectic regards logic from the standpoint 

 of epistemological realism, in which the real deliverances of the 

 senses are conceptually transformed by the spontaneous activity 

 of reason. This spirit of realism is similar to that of Aristotle, in which 

 the one-sided a priori view of knowledge is controverted. Space and 

 time are forms of the existence of things, and not merely a priori 



