RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES 303 



ism. Inasmuch as thought sometimes misses its aim, as is shown 

 by the fact that error and dispute exist, there is need of a discipline 

 whose purpose is to show us how to attain and establish truth and 

 avoid error. This is the practical aim of logic, as distinguished from 

 the psychological treatment of thought, where the distinction between 

 true and false has no more place than the distinction between good 

 and bad. Logic presupposes the impulse to discover truth, and it 

 therefore sets forth the criteria of true thinking, and endeavors 

 to describe those normative operations whose aim is validity of 

 judgment. Consequently logic falls into the two parts of (1) critical, 

 (2) technical, the former having meaning only in reference to the 

 latter; the main value of logic is to be sought in its function as art. 

 " Methodology, therefore, which is generally made to take a subor- 

 dinate place, should be regarded as the special, final, and chief aim of 

 our science." (Logic, vol. i, p. 21, Eng. Tr.) As an art, logic under- 

 takes to determine under what conditions and prescriptions judgments 

 are valid, but does not undertake to pass upon the validity of the con- 

 tent of given judgments. Its prescriptions have regard only to formal 

 correctness and not to the material truth of results. Logic is, there- 

 fore, a formal discipline. Its business is with the due procedure of 

 thought, and it attempts to show no more than how we may advance 

 in the reasoning process in such way that each step is valid and 

 necessary. If logic were to tell us what to think or give us the con- 

 tent of thought, it would be commensurate with the whole of science. 

 Sigwart, however, does not mean by formal thought independence of 

 content, for it is not possible to disregard the particular manner in 

 which the materials and content of thought are delivered through 

 sensation and formed into ideas. Further, logic having for its chief 

 business the methodology of science, the development of knowledge 

 from empirical data, it ought to include a theory of knowledge, but 

 it should not so far depart from its subjective limits as to include 

 within its province the discussion of metaphysical implications or 

 a theory of being. For this reason, Sigwart relegates to a postscript 

 his discussion of teleology, but he gives an elaborate treatment of 

 epistemology extending through vol. i and develops his account of 

 methodology in vol. n. The question regarding the relation between 

 necessity, the element in which logical thought moves, and freedom, 

 the postulate of the will, carries one beyond the confines of logic and 

 is, in his opinion, the profoundest problem of metaphysics, whose 

 function is to deal with the ultimate relation between "subject 

 and object, the world and the individual, and this is not only basal 

 for logic and all science, but is the crown and end of them all." 



Wundt's psychological and methodological treatment of logic 

 stands midway between the purely formal treatises on the one hand , 

 and the metaphysical treatises on the other hand. The general 



