RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES 307 



merely with the structural aspect of inferential thought, and its 

 validity in terms of internal congruity; (2) metaphysical logic whose 

 concern is with the functional aspect of thought, its validity in 

 terms of objective reference, and its relation to reality; (3) epi- 

 stemological and methodological logic, whose concern is with the 

 genesis, nature, and laws of logical thinking as forms of scientific 

 knowledge, and with their technological application to the sciences 

 as methodology. I am not at present concerned with a criticism 

 of these various viewpoints, excepting in so far as they affect the 

 problem of the interrelationship of logic and the allied disciplines. 



For my present purpose I reject the extreme metaphysical and 

 formal positions, and assume that logic is a discipline \vhose busi- 

 ness is to describe and systematize the formal processes of inferential 

 thought and to apply them as practical principles to the body of 

 real knowledge. 



I wish now to take up seriatim the several questions touching 

 the various relations of logic enumerated above, and first of all the 

 question of the relation of logic as science to logic as art. 



I. Logic as science and logic as art. 



It seems true that the founder of logic, Aristotle, regarded logic 

 not as a science, but rather as propadeutic to science, and not as an 

 end in itself, but rather technically and heuristically as an instrument. 

 In other words, logic was conceived by him rather in its application 

 or as an art, than as a science, and so it continued to be regarded 

 until the close of the Middle Ages, being characterized indeed as the 

 ars artium; for even the logica docens of the Scholastics was merely 

 the formulation of that body of precepts which are of practical serv- 

 ice in the syllogistic arrangement of premises, and the Port Royal 

 Logic aims to furnish I'art de penser. This technical aspect of the 

 science has clung to it down to the present day, and is no doubt 

 a legitimate description of a part of its function. But no one would 

 now say that logic is an art; rather it is a body of theory which 

 may be technically applied. Mill, in his examination of Sir William 

 Hamilton's Philosophy (p. 391), says of logic that it "is the art of 

 thinking, which means of correct thinking, and the science of the 

 conditions of correct thinking," and indeed, he goes so far as to say 

 (System of Logic, Introd. 7) : " The extension of logic as a science 

 is determined by its necessities as an art." Strictly speaking, logic 

 as a science is purely theoretical, for the function of science as such 

 is merely to know. It is an organized S3 r stem of knowledge, namely, 

 an organized system of the principles and conditions of correct 

 thinking. But because correct thinking is an art, it does not follow 

 that a knowledge of the methods and conditions of correct thinking 



