310 LOGIC 



as we have said, is the whole of psychical phenomena; the aim of 

 individual psychology in the investigation of its field is: (1) to give 

 a genetic account of cognition, feeling, and will, or whatever be the 

 elements into which consciousness is analyzed; (2) to explain their 

 interconnections causally; (3) as a chemistry of mental life to 

 analyze its complexes into their simplest elements; (4) to explain the 

 totality structurally (or functionally) out of the elements; (5) to 

 carry on its investigation and set forth its results as a purely empir- 

 ical science; (6) psychology makes no attempt to evaluate the 

 processes of mind either in terms of false and true, or good and bad. 

 From this description of the field and function of psychology, based 

 on the expressions of its modern exponents, it will be found impossible 

 to shelter logic under it as a subordinate discipline. If one were to 

 enlarge the scope of psychology to mean rational psychology, in the 

 sense which Professor Howison advocates (Psychological Review, 

 vol. in, p. 652), such a subordination might be possible, but it would 

 entail the loss of all that the new psychology has gained by the 

 sharper delimitation of its sphere and problems, and would carry us 

 back to the position of Mill, who appears to identify psychology 

 with philosophy at large and with metaphysics. 



In contradistinction to the aims of psychology as described in 

 the foregoing, the sphere and problems of logic may be summarily 

 characterized as follows: (1) All concepts and judgments are psycho- 

 logical complexes and processes and may be genetically and struc- 

 turally described; that is the business of psychology. They also have 

 a meaning value, or objective reference, that is, they may be correct 

 or incorrect, congruous or incongruous with reality. The meaning, 

 aspect of thought, or its content as truth is the business of logic. 

 This subject-matter is got by regarding a single aspect in the 

 total psychological complex. (2) Its aim is not to describe factual 

 thought or the whole of thought, or the natural processes of thought, 

 but only certain ideals of thinking, namely, the norms of correct 

 thinking. Its object is not a datum, but an ideal. (3) While psycho- 

 logy is concerned with the natural history of reasoning, logic is 

 concerned with the warrants of inferential reasoning. In the term- 

 inology of Hamilton it is the nomology of discursive thought. To 

 use an often employed analogy, psychology is the physics of thought, 

 logic an ethics of thought. (4) Logic implies an epistemology or 

 theory of cognition in so far as epistemology discusses the concept 

 and judgment and their relations to the real world, and here is to be 

 found its closest connection with psychology. A purely formal logic, 

 which is concerned merely with the internal order of knowledge and 

 does not undertake to show how the laws of thought originate, why 

 they hold good as the measures of evidence, or in what way they are 

 applicable to concrete reality, would be as barren as scholasticism. 



