312 LOGIC 



merely with the inferential and methodological processes whereby 

 this result is reached. The former is a science of content; the latter is 

 a science of procedure and relations. Now, inasmuch as procedure 

 and relations apply to some reality and differ with different forms of 

 reality, logic necessitates in its implications a theory of being, but 

 such implications are in no wise to be identified with its subject- 

 matter or with its own proper problems. Their consideration falls 

 within the sphere of metaphysics or a broadly conceived epistemo- 

 logy, whose business it is to solve the ultimate questions of subject 

 and object, thought and thing, mind and matter, that are implied 

 and pointed to rather than formulated by logic. Inasmuch as the 

 logical judgment says something about something, the scientific 

 impulse drives us to investigate what the latter something ultimately 

 is; but this is not necessary for logic, nor is it one of logic's legitimate 

 problems, any more than it is the proper business of the physicist to 

 investigate the mental implications of his scientific judgments and 

 hypotheses or the ultimate nature of the theorizing and perceiving 

 mind, or of causality to his world of matter and motion, although a 

 general scientific interest may drive him to seek a solution of these 

 ultimate metaphysical problems. Scientifically the end of logic and 

 of every discipline is in itself; it is a territorial unity, and its govern- 

 ment is administered with a unitary aim. Logic is purely a science 

 of evidential values, not a science of content (in the meaning of 

 particular reality, as in the special sciences, or of ultimate reality, 

 as in metaphysics); its sole aim and purpose, as I conceive it, is to 

 formulate the laws and grounds of evidence, the principles of method, 

 and the conditions and forms of inferential thinking. When it has 

 done this, it has, as a single science, done its whole work. When one 

 looks at the present tendencies of logical theory, one is inclined to 

 believe that the discipline is in danger of becoming an " Allerleiwis- 

 senschajt," whose vast undefined territory is the land of " Weiss- 

 nichtwo." The strict delimitation of the field and problems of science 

 is demanded in the interest of a serviceable division of scientific labor 

 and in the interest of an intelligible classification of the accumulated 

 products of research. 



