THE FIELD OF LOGIC 319 



epistemologies based thereon. It is, of course, impossible here to 

 defend my position by an elaborate analysis of these metaphysical 

 systems. But I will say this. I am in entire agreement with idealism 

 in its claim that questions of knowledge and of the nature of reality 

 cannot ultimately be separated, because we can know reality only 

 as we know it. But the general question as to how we know reality 

 can still be raised. By this I do not mean the question, how is it 

 possible for us to have knowledge at all, or how it is possible for reality 

 to be known at all, but how, as a matter of fact, we actually do know 

 it? That we really do know it, I would most emphatically claim. 

 Still further, I would claim that what we know about it is determined, 

 not by the fact that we can know in general, but by the way reality, 

 as distinct from our knowledge, has determined. These ways appear 

 to me to be ascertainable, and form, thus, undoubtedly, a section 

 of metaphysics. But the metaphysics will naturally be realistic rather 

 than idealistic. 



Ill 



Just as logical processes may be regarded as, at the same time, 

 psychological processes, so they may be regarded, with equal right, 

 as vital processes, coming thus under the categories of evolution. 

 The tendency so to regard them is very marked at the present day, 

 especially in France and in this country. In France, the movement 

 has perhaps received the clearer definition. In America the union of 

 logic and biology is complicated - - and at times even lost sight of - 

 by emphasis on the idea of evolution generally. It is not my intention 

 to trace the history of this movement, but I should like to call atten- 

 tion to its historic motive in order to get it in a clear light. 



That the theory of evolution, even Darwinism itself, has radically 

 transformed our historical, scientific, and philosophical methods, is 

 quite evident. Add to this the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, 

 with its own doctrine of development, and one finds the causes of 

 the rather striking unanimity which is discoverable in many ways 



* 



between Hegelian idealists, on the one hand, and philosophers of 

 evolution of Spencer's type, on the other. Although two men would, 

 perhaps, not appear more radically different at first sight than Hegel 

 and Spencer, I am inclined to believe that we shall come to recognize 

 more and more in them an identity of philosophical conception. The 

 pragmatism of the day is a striking confirmation of this opinion, for 

 it is often the expression of Hegelian ideas in Darwinian and Spencer- 

 ian terminology. The claims of idealism and of evolutionary science 

 and philosophy have thus sought reconciliation. Logic has been, 

 naturally, the last of the sciences to yield to evolutionary and genetic 

 treatment. It could not escape long, especially when the idea of 

 evolution had been so successful in its handling of ethics. If morality 



