THE RELATIONS OF AESTHETICS 431 



Nor are the problems of aesthetics without relation to pure meta- 

 physic. The existence of aesthetic standards must be considered by 

 the metaphysician, and these standards, with those of logic and ethics, 

 must be treated by him as data for the study of ontological 

 problems. 



But beyond this, aesthetics cries out for special aid from the 

 ontologist. What, he asks, is the significance of our standards of 

 aesthetic appreciation? What the inner nature of that which we call 

 the real of beauty? What its relation with the real of goodness 

 and the real of truth? 



From a practical standpoint this last-mentioned question is of 

 special import at this time. For the world of art has for centuries 

 been torn asunder by the contention of the aesthetic realists and their 

 opponents. 



That, in its real essence, beauty is truth, and truth beauty, is 

 a claim which has often been, and is still heard; and it is a claim 

 which must finally be adjudicated by the metaphysician who deals 

 with the nature of the real. 



The practical importance of the solution of this problem is brought 

 home forcibly to those who, like myself, seem to see marked aesthetic 

 deterioration in the work of those artists who have been led to listen 

 to the claims of aesthetic realism; who learn to strive for the expres- 

 sion of truth, thinking thus certainly to gain beauty. 



That many great artists have announced themselves as aesthetic 

 realists shows how powerfully the claims of the doctrine appeal to 

 them. But one who studies the artistic work of Leonardo, for in- 

 stance, cannot but believe that he was a great artist notwithstanding 

 his theoretical belief, and cannot but believe that all others of his 

 way of thinking, so far as they are artists, are such because in them 

 genius has overridden their dogmatic thought. 



It is clearly not without significance that the world of values is 

 by common consent held to be covered by the categories of the True, 

 the Good, and the Beautiful. This common consent seems surely 

 to imply that each of the three is independent of the other two, 

 although all are bound together in one group. And if this is true, then 

 the claim of the aesthetic realist can surely not be correct. 



But this claim will not be overthrown by any reference to such 

 a generalization as that above mentioned. The claim of the aesthetic 

 realist is based upon what he feels to be clear evidence founded upon 

 experience; and he cannot be answered unless we are able to show 

 him what is the basis for his ready conviction that truth and beauty 

 are one and identical; and what is the true relation between the 

 True, the Good, and the Beautiful. And these problems, which are 

 in our day of vital importance to the artist, the philosopher alone 

 can answer. 



