RELATION OF ETHICS TO SOCIAL SCIENCE 677 



gression from one dominant idea to another, the conception of social 

 law might still be justified. But the attempts to prove such a 

 regular law of transition are futile. The passage, for instance, from 

 polytheism to the higher forms of religion does not indicate the 

 working of any uniform principle of development, but has actually 

 been achieved along the most divergent lines. In one case the next 

 step after polytheism was intellectual monotheism or the monothe- 

 ism that reflects the idea of intellectual unity, as among the Greeks; 

 in another case it was the monotheism that reflects the idea of power, 

 as among the followers of Mohammed; among the Hebrews it was 

 the monotheism that corresponds to the idea of supreme righteous- 

 ness. In other cases polytheism has passed over into pantheism, 

 as among theBrahmans; and in still another into intellectual nihil- 

 ism, as among the Buddhists. Race characteristics enter in largely 

 to determine the course of development; and these in their nature, 

 their development, and their influence are quite incalculable. The 

 influence of great men, or of .what from the standpoint of onlookers 

 must be called the accident of genius, despite much that has been 

 said to the contrary, likewise enters in as a determining force; and 

 genius in its derivation and its possible effects, is incalculable. And 

 I should ' be untrue to my inmost conviction if I did not add that 

 the idea of moral freedom also enters in; and this, too, in the extent 

 of the influence which it may acquire, is unpredictable. The con- 

 clusion, therefore, to which I am led is that social science is con- 

 cerned with uniformities and not with laws; that these uniformities 

 differ from physical laws not only in degree but in kind; and hence, 

 that in the nature of the case there can be no such thing as a law 

 of social development, and that it is not only useless, but in principle 

 a mistake, to look to social science for the formulation of those 

 ideals which are to shape the future evolution of human society. 



But if social science cannot furnish ethical ideals, are we to infer 

 that the time spent in it is a waste of effort, and, more particularly, 

 that its help in the task of social improvement can be dispensed 

 with? I most emphatically avow my conviction that the contrary is 

 the case, that the help of social science is indispensable, that it has 

 already rendered invaluable services to human progress, and that it 

 will render still greater services in proportion as it exploits its oppor- 

 tunities within its own limits, instead of seeking to transcend those 

 limits. For a moment let me attract your attention to some of the 

 most signal benefits which we have received and may further expect 

 at its hands. Social science has taught us the great and useful lesson 

 that all institutions, even those that seemed most stable, have 

 changed, and hence that they are liable to further change. It has 

 thus lightened the yoke of custom, made us ashamed of our mental 

 and moral provincialisms, and dissipated the false glamour that often 



