TRANSPORTATION 89 



still shorter term. And, nevertheless, Prussia could better than only 

 satisfactorily supply its field army in war, inasmuch as not only 

 Germany as a whole, but also foreign countries contributed to the 

 sustenance of the troops; for example, at the beginning of war the 

 Secretary of War had purchased forthwith three million pounds of 

 preserved meat, hard biscuit, oats, and pressed hay in England to be 

 delivered to the Rhine. 1 The centralizing effect of a highly devel- 

 oped system of transportation is shown also there. The entire state, 

 with its industry, production of the soil, with all its auxiliary forces 

 of each kind, had assumed the role of the " basis ; " the widespread 

 net of railways had become the substitute of that formerly so-called 

 basis. It is evident that this valuation of the railroads in the 

 service of the army was not completely understood at first. The 

 first author who considers the railway seriously, from a military 

 point of view, and has a very clear insight into its importance, 

 Ponitz, 2 still considers the transportation of one hundred thousand 

 men, with all supplies, improbable for great distances. 



The first experiences with transportation of troops was gained 

 by Austria. In the war of 1859 against France and Piedmont, its 

 insufficient system of railways proved to be a disadvantage of serious 

 consequence. 3 Only the experiences of the American Civil War, 

 especially on the side of the Northern States, opened a new epoch. 

 There a special corps of troops was formed, equipped with copious 

 material with which railways were built or destroyed. The state 

 alone ruled all railways through a "department of military railroad." 

 General David MacCallum, who was the chief of this department, is 

 the real founder of the military railway system. 4 In the wars of 1866 

 and 1870-71, the importance of the railroads became strikingly 

 evident in Germany. Prussia had five railroad lines at its disposal 

 in 1866 for its invasion of Bohemia, while Austria possessed there 

 but one line; in 1870 Germany could send its armies against France 

 by means of nine lines, while France had only three at its disposal. 

 Only thus was it possible that within the short space between July 

 24 and August 3, in two weeks, 350,000 men, 87,000 horses, 8400 

 cannon and vehicles were sent to the frontier. Therefore the numeri- 

 cal preponderance upon the battlefield was secured for the German 

 army from the very beginning; this is the factor to which, according 

 to the experiences of the history of war, the most celebrated generals 

 of all times owe their victories. 5 Upon such experiences military 



1 Engelhardt, Riickblick auf die Verpflcgsverhallnisse im Kriege, 1S70-71, 

 BciJieft zum Militarischen Wochenblatt, 1901. 



2 Ponitz, Die Eisenbahnen als Militdrische Opcrafionlinien, 1842. 



3 Geschichte der Eisenbahnen dcr Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen MonarcJi/', 

 23. Band, 1898: Die Eisenbahnen im Kricgc. 



4 Joesten, Geschichte dcr Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege, 1896, S. 11. 



5 Obauer und Guttenbero;, Das Train-Kommunications-und Vcrpflegswesen 

 vom operativen Siandpunkt, 1871, S. 50. 



