466 JURISPRUDENCE 



to community life, and in the adjustment contending, one class 

 insisting upon a certain rule of conduct and another class claiming 

 another rule with reference to a particular matter; neither party 

 obtained what it claimed, but they agreed at last upon a rule that 

 should be observed by both. A common practice was thus estab- 

 lished, which in time was recognized and enforced by the courts and 

 became a common law. For illustration, the feudal lord demanded 

 unlimited service from his vassal with undefined rights in the land, 

 and the vassal made like demands upon those under him. The 

 sturdy Saxon, loving definiteness, demanded that the amount of 

 service which he was to render to his overlord should be defined and 

 for that service he should have a particular interest in the soil. 

 Out of these controversies, extending through years of time, there 

 came at last a complex system of real-estate law, with its multitudi- 

 nous tenements and rights. Again, the king contended for absolute 

 sovereignty; the lords and their followers asked for certain liberties 

 and rules of conduct, to be obeyed not only by the people, but by 

 the king himself. There was stubborn contention, and out of it 

 came the English constitution. These differences in origin between 

 the two great systems would certainly give the greatest opportunity 

 for two sciences of law. But can it be said that the fundamental 

 principles of right which control those relations of men, generally 

 recognized as having legal consequences, are so very different in the 

 two systems? There may be a difference of theory, difference of 

 application, possibly a difference of condition upon which the law 

 becomes applicable, but, so far as substantive right is concerned, 

 there is remarkable similarity in the two systems. 



Doctor Holland, in his admirable work upon jurisprudence, says: 

 " A science of law might undoubtedly be constructed from a know- 

 ledge of the law of England alone, as a science of geology might be, 

 and in great part was, constructed from an observation of the strata 

 in England only; yet as there is no particular science of geology, so 

 neither is there a particular science of law. For a science is a system 

 of generalizations which, though they may be derived from obser- 

 vations extending over a limited area, will nevertheless hold good 

 everywhere; assuming the object-matter of the science to possess 

 everywhere the same characteristics." It is true, as again stated, 

 that " the wider the field of observation, the greater, of course, will 

 be the chance of the principles of a science being rightly and com- 

 pletely enunciated; but, so far as they are scientific truths at all, 

 they are always general and of universal application." 



After careful study of the subject, the foregoing position taken 

 by this distinguished author seems to be correct in speaking of 

 jurisprudence as a science. We shall find, as the science of law 

 develops, that the tendency will be to a clear statement and co- 



