PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL THEORY 335 



Such definitions give rise to the problem of classification and 

 determination of the character of the so-called half-sovereign, parti- 

 sovereign states, or fragments of states. 1 At the same time the 

 extreme definition of sovereignty gives rise to the problem of the 

 political status of members of federal states, confederations, and 

 other unions. To this problem some give the terse solution that 

 such are not states at all, but retain their names as such only by 

 courtesy and should receive consideration only as administrative 

 divisions. This is the position which has been growing more and 

 more into the political theory of the past forty years. The question 

 arises as to whether this theory has not simply reflected the actual 

 political development of the period. 



Are states which voluntarily make treaties limiting the range of 

 their freedom of action therefore no longer sovereign? If so, just 

 what kind of a treaty renders the loss of sovereignty certain? Is it 

 such a treaty as the defensive treaty between Great Britain and 

 Japan, the Triple Alliance Agreement, the Arbitration Treaties of 

 1904, or the Anglo-Franco Agreement in regard to North Africa? 

 All of these limit the free exercise of sovereign powers in certain 

 respects. What is the position of neutralized states? Such pro- 

 blems as these become of practical importance for international law. 

 While international law admits that "it is not inconsistent with 

 sovereignty that a state should voluntarily take upon itself obliga- 

 tions to other states, even though the obligations be assumed under 

 stress of war, or fear of evil," 2 yet there remains the problem of 

 determining the limit to which obligations may be assumed without 

 loss of sovereignty. A state may be deeply in debt and still be 

 classed as sovereign, may be neutralized, may be closely bound to 

 another or to several other states, may be internally disorganized, 

 may be insignificant in area, population, and power, or seemingly 

 may lack all attributes but recognition in the family of nations, and 

 still be regarded as sovereign in international law. Is it necessary 

 to answer that some of these " are sovereign because they are states 

 and are states because they are sovereign "? 



The problem arises as to how far sovereignty may be said to exist 

 among these so-called states, and further, how such conceptions as 

 spheres of influence and the like shall be regarded, and, again, how 

 far sovereignty can be divided in states of various forms. Indeed, 

 the question may be seriously raised whether there is at the present 

 day with the close system of international relationships any sove- 

 reign state and whether with an extreme definition of sovereignty 

 theorists will not soon be discussing a political phenomenon which 

 has no corresponding entity in fact. 



1 Jcllinck, Ueber Staatsfragmente. 



2 Wilson and Tucker, International Law, p. 40. 



