336 THEORY AND ADMINISTRATION 



With such political doctrines as the " concert of powers," " dom- 

 inant influence," " Monroe Doctrine," " world conferences," etc., 

 will not new and wide modification of a theory enunciated in the 

 sixteenth century be necessary? 



There are also numerous problems centering about sovereignty as 

 viewed from an internal as well as from the international standpoint. 

 Here the problems of federation, confederation, colonies, protect- 

 orates and other subdivisions need merely to be mentioned as sug- 

 gestive of fruitful fields for discussion. 



Again, such questions as the residence of sovereignty, the divis- 

 ibility of sovereignty, the nature of the legal sovereign, and many 

 others offer problems which are not yet fully solved. 



All definitions of the state recognize its political nature and that 

 it may exercise its authority in political affairs. This does not, 

 however, solve the ancient problem of the limit to which the state 

 may extend its authority. In ancient days, when the state was 

 everything and man was held to exist for the state, the problem was 

 much more simple than in the days of pronounced individualism. 

 The problem of the limits of state interference has always been a 

 difficult one. The reaction against the medieval state with its privi- 

 leged classes left a strong prejudice against state interference which 

 the doctrines of individualism strengthened. The problem is to 

 establish the proper degree of state regulation. As the state is 

 political, its action should be for public ends. The solution of the 

 limits of interference with and regulation of individual action can 

 in part be determined by theory as to what is individual and what 

 public; e. g., religion is now generally regarded as personal and not 

 subject to state regulation, while freedom to worship is regarded as 

 something to be secured by public authority as conducive to public 

 well-being. The state exists for civic purposes. The individual 

 considers his life as his own to be lived in freedom. To determine 

 at what point the state authority may properly begin or cease is 

 easy in extreme instances. There is, however, a wide zone in which 

 this question is open to debate; e. g., undoubtedly the proper edu- 

 cation of children is a moral duty resting upon the parent, and to 

 relieve the parent of this duty may weaken him morally, yet the 

 state in many instances educates the child and compels him to attend 

 school even when the parent may object. The question of the 

 nature of the interference aids in clearing the problem of interfer- 

 ence of some difficulties. If interference is classified, as with (a) 

 beliefs, (&) property, and (c) conduct, a general solution of the 

 problem can be more easily reached. Beliefs would in general be 

 individual. Property is at least protected by the state, if not 

 made possible by the state. Conduct may be individual or may 

 affect the state. With beliefs the state would not interfere; over 



