THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL CAUSES. 491 



anatomizers of plants and animals, in order to investigate their struc- 

 ture, and to obtain an insight into the grounds why and to what end 

 such parts, why such a situation and connexion of the parts, and 

 exactly such an internal form, come before them, assume, as indispen- 

 sably necessary, this maxim, that in such a creature nothing is in vain, 

 and proceed upon it in the same way in which in general natural phi- 

 losophy we proceed upon the principle that nothing happens by chance. 

 In fact, they can as little free themselves from this Ideological principle 

 as from the general physical one ; for as, on omitting the latter, no 

 experience would be possible, so on omitting the former principle, no 

 clue could exist for the observation of a kind of natural objects which 

 can be considered teleologically under the conception of natural ends." 



Even if the reader should not follow the reasoning of this celebrated 

 philosopher, he will still have no difficulty in seeing that he asserts, in 

 the most distinct manner, that which is denied by the author whom 

 we have before quoted, the propriety and necessity of assuming the 

 existence of an end as our guide in the study of animal organization. 



4. It appears to me, therefore, that whether we judge from the argu- 

 ments, the results, the practice of physiologists, their speculative 

 opinions, or those of the philosophers of a wider field, we are led to the 

 same conviction, that in the organized world we may and must adopt 

 the belief, that organization exists for its purpose, and that the appre- 

 hension of the purpose may guide us in seeing the meaning of the 

 organization. And I now proceed to show how this principle has beet 

 brought into additional clearness and use by Cuvier. 



In doing this, I may, perhaps, be allowed to make a reflection of a 

 kind somewhat different from the preceding remarks, though suggested 

 by them. In another work, 18 I endeavored to show that those who 

 have been discoverers in science have generally had minds, the dispo- 

 sition of which was to believe in an intelligent Maker of the universe ; 

 and that the scientific speculations which produced an opposite ten- 

 dency, were generally those which, though they might deal familiarly 

 with known physical truths, and conjecture boldly with regard to the 

 unknown, did not add to the number of solid generalizations. In order 

 to judge whether this remark is distinctly applicable in the case now 

 considered, I should have to estimate Cuvier in comparison with other 

 physiologists of his time, which I do not presume to do. But I may 



18 Bridgewater Treatise, B. iii. c. vii. and viii. On Inductive Habits of 

 Thought, and on Deductive Habits of Thought. 



