96 WALLACE CRAIG. 



here ascribed to appetite, are the very ones which I have observed 

 in the instinctive behavior of pigeons. The instincts of pigeons 

 satisfy Baldwin's further description of appetite in that each 

 appears first as a "state of vague unrest" involving especially 

 "the organs by which the gratification is to be secured"; and 

 "a complex state of tension of all the motor . . . elements 

 whenever the appetite is aroused either (a) by the direct organic 

 condition of need, or (6) indirectly through the presence or mem- 

 ory of the object." This last point is illustrated, e. g., by doves 

 learning to drink (example i, page 97), in whom the sight of the 

 water-dish at a distance aroused the drinking actions by asso- 

 ciative memory. I have observed appetitive behavior as Bald- 

 win describes it in nearly all the instinctive activities of doves, 

 and I think that sufficient observation w T ill reveal it in all their 

 instincts. 



The most thorough attempt to distinguish instincts from 

 appetites and to show the logical consequences of such distinc- 

 tion, in all the literature to which I have access, is in an old 

 article by Professor Bowen ('46). This article is still worth 

 study, to suggest the conclusions to which one is logically led if 

 he denies that instincts contain any element of appetite. These 

 conclusions, taken almost literally from Bowen, may be sum- 

 marized as follows: (i) (P. 95) "If the name of instinct be 

 denied to these original and simple preferences [appetites] and 

 aversions, there will appear good reason to doubt whether man 

 is ever governed by instinct, whether all his actions are not 

 reducible to passion, appetite, and reason." (P. 115) The 

 "passions" of man can not be concomitants of instinct. (2) (P. 

 117) "Instinct is not a free and conscious power of the animal 

 itself. It is, if we may so speak, a foreign agency, which enters 

 not into the individuality of the brute." (P. 118) Instinct "has 

 no effect on the rest of their conduct, which is governed by their 

 own individuality." (3) Bowen contends with logical consis- 

 tency that if instinct contains no appetitive factor, the ends to- 

 ward which instincts work, as seen by an observer, are not ends 

 for the agent; that therefore the agent has no power to make the 

 instinctive behavior more effective. In short, instinctive be- 

 havior is not susceptible of improvement by intelligence. (4) 



