DOUBLE PERSONALITY. 69 



ary self which may exist simultaneously with the upper self, and 

 in a way beneath it as above described ? 



There is good reason for thinking that they do, to some ex- 

 tent to what extent is a question more easily asked than answered. 

 In the first place, if the two groups are to be entirely distinct, 

 there scarcely seems to be enough mental material to go around. 

 The primary system would be so maimed and the secondary so 

 incomplete that one could scarcely regard either as a full-fledged 

 personality. If certain elements are to be simultaneously held in 

 common by both groups the case would be different, but, so far 

 as I know, there is no good evidence for this. In the second 

 place, the will, or sense of effort, which I believe to be the essence 

 of the self, raises a serious difficulty. We practically know noth- 

 ing of its nature. The rival theories may be regarded as falling 

 under two heads those that make will but a name for the control 

 exerted by the more complex ideas over the more simple, and 

 those that make it something absolutely unique in mental life, 

 and in no respect analogous to the control exerted by ideas, 

 whether complex or simple. If we adopt the first, it is hard to 

 believe that the secondary system could attain the degree of com- 

 plexity necessary to the manifestation of will without destroying 

 the complexity of the primary ; if we adopt the second, it is as 

 hard to believe that two of these unique phenomena should appear 

 in one body. If the secondary system manifested a will of its 

 own, we should expect to find that the primary had lost it, and 

 then we would not have two simultaneous selves, but merely suc- 

 cessive modifications of the original self, as in the cases discussed 

 in my last paper. 



Turning now from the abstract to the concrete, I shall give 

 some of the facts upon which these conceptions are based. First 

 I shall take up the case of Prof. Pierre Janet's famous patient 

 Lucie, and show how he tried to prove in her the existence of sub- 

 conscious states, and how he apparently succeeded in organizing 

 them into a sort of dream self which existed only in his presence, 

 faded away when he departed, and finally vanished when Lucie 

 recovered her health. Then I shall try to throw a little light 

 upon the actual character of this " amorphous mind " and the re- 

 lations which may exist between secondary states and the primary 

 system. 



When Lucie fell into Prof. Janet's hands,* she was about nine- 

 teen years of age. She was intelligent, quick-witted, hot-tempered, 

 and had a strong will of her own. She had wholly lost her sensa- 



The mcst detailed accounts of Lucie's case are in Prof. Janet's articles in the Re- 

 vue Fhilosophique, vol. xxii, pp. 577-592 ; vol. xxiii, pp. 449-572. More facts are to be 

 found in his work V Automatisme Pnychologique and in his other writings. 



