HERBERT SPENCER AND BIS WORK. 439 



But it is time, turning from the man to his work, to proceed 

 to the exposition of some of the fundamental principles of the 

 Spencerian system of philosophy. 



It is important, in the first place, to make clear the meaning 

 which Mr. Spencer attaches to the word philosophy, as this will 

 define for us the scope and purpose of his undertaking. By phi- 

 losophy, then, to begin with a negative statement of his position, 

 he does not understand an effort to solve the ultimate problem of 

 the universe. He recognizes two categories the Unknowable 

 and the Knowable ; and to the former of these, the proper domain 

 of religion, he relegates all those final questions concerning Abso- 

 lute Being, and the why and wherefore of the cosmos, which have 

 largely absorbed the attention of the metaphysicians questions 

 which, owing to the conditions under which all our thinking has 

 to be done, lie forever beyond the scope of human intelligence. 

 The true subject-matter of philosophy, therefore, is not the prob- 

 lem of absolute cause and end, but of secondary causes and ends 

 not noumenal and unconditioned existence, but the manifesta- 

 tions of the noumenal in and through the co' ditioned and phe- 

 nomenal. What, then, do we demand from philosophy ? Not an 

 explanation of the universe in terms of Being as distinguished 

 from Appearance; but a complete co-ordination or systematic 

 organization of those cosmical laws by which we symbolize the 

 processes of the universe, and the interrelations of the various 

 phenomena of which the universe, as revealed to us, is actually 

 composed.* The old antithesis between common knowledge and 

 what we call science, on the one hand, and philosophy on the 

 other, forthwith disappears. They are not essentially unlike; 

 their differences are differences of degree in generality and uni- 

 fication. "As each widest generalization of science comprehends 

 and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division, 

 so the generalizations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate 

 the widest generalizations of science." Philosophy is thus pre- 

 sented as " the final product of that process which begins with a 

 .mere colligation of crude observations, goes on establishing 

 propositions that are broader and more separated from particular 

 cases, and ends in universal propositions. Or, to bring the defini- 

 tion to its simplest and clearest form : knowledge of the lowest 

 'kmdi {A ununified knowledge; science is partially unified knowl- 

 edge ; philosophy is completely unified knowledge." f 



Now, if philosophy is to undertake this complete unification of 



* Here, and in a few other places in' this brief outline, I have not scrupled to make use 

 of the very phrases that I have employed in the more extended treatment of the same sub- 

 ject in my Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. 



f First Principles, 3*7. 



