PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION. 607 



'herefore, under such a government upon the person or property 

 jf its citizens that does not conform to these conditions is not for 

 a public purpose and is not entitled to be called taxation. 



The following further amplification of these propositions by 

 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has probably also the 

 unqualified indorsement of all judicial authorities in the United 

 States : 



" The incidental advantage to the public, or the State, which 

 results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity 

 of private enterprise or business, does not justify their aid by the 

 use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation 

 may become necessary. It is the essential character of the direct 

 object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as 

 justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be 

 affected, nor the degree to which the general advantage of the 

 community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately bene- 

 fited by their promotion. Tlie principle of this distinction is fun- 

 daweiital. It underlies all government that is based upon reason 

 rather than upon force." Lowell vs. Boston, 111 Mass., 1^5 Jf.. 



" It has become a favorite maxim that it is the duty of govern- 

 ment to promote the happiness of the people. The phrase may 

 be interpreted so as to mean well, but it is a very inaccurate and 

 unhappy one. It is the inalienable right of men to pursue their 

 own happiness, each man under such restraint of law as will leave 

 every other man equally free to do the same. The happiness of 

 the people is the happiness of the individuals who compose the 

 mass. Speaking now with reference to those objects only which 

 human laws can reach and influence, he is the happy man who 

 sees his condition in life constantly and gradually, though it may 

 be slowly, improving. Let government keep its hands off, do 

 nothing in the way of creating the subject-matter of speculation, 

 and things naturally fall into this channel." Sharswood, Legal 

 Ethics. 



The distinction between a public and a private purpose in re- 

 spect to taxation, however, is often a matter of great difficulty 

 and embarrassment ; and one eminent jurist and writer on taxa- 

 tion (Cooley) has indeed declared that " there is no such thing as 

 drawing a clear line of distinction between purposes of a public 

 and those of a private nature." But the question at issue has 

 been so often made the subject of definition and illustration by 

 the highest courts of the United States speaking through jurists 

 of the highest conceded ability that, although complete unison 

 of opinion does not now and probably never will exist as to 

 whether certain particular purposes, as expenditures by the State 

 for bounties, facilitating transportation, education, charities, 

 amusements, celebrations, and the like, are within the requirements 



