PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION. 617 



brought the argument in support of the "unlimited" theory 

 to a reductio ad ahsurdum : 



"A power to lay taxes for the common defense and general 

 welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general 

 power." It is " a power exclusively given to raise revenue, and it 

 can constitutionally be applied to no other purpose. The appli- 

 cation for other purposes is an abuse of the power ; and in fact, 

 however it may be in form disguised, is a premeditated usurpa- 

 tion of authority." A grant under the Constitution to Congress 

 " to do any act they pleased which ought to be for the good of the 

 Union . . . would reduce the whole instrument to a single phase, 

 that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be 

 for the good of the United States ; and as they would be the sole 

 judges of good or evil, it would also be a power to do whatever 

 evil they pleased" (1 Story, Constitution, section 926). 



Second, to the assumption that the decisions of the State courts 

 in respect to the limitations of the power of taxation do not apply 

 to this controversy, it was replied that the relation of the State 

 courts to their State Constitutions is substantially the same as that 

 existing between the Federal Supreme Court and Congress ; that 

 the State decisions (which have not been, as was claimed, " all cases 

 of municipal taxation") frequently treat such legislatio*n, inde- 

 pendently of Constitutions, as being in violation of natural right, 

 and that there are limitations imposed upon legislative, power 

 by reason of "general principles" has been recognized by the 

 United States Supreme Court (Bartemeyer vs. Iowa, 12 Wallace). 

 It would further seem that natural rights must be the same, 

 whether against legislation by Congress or by the Legislature of 

 a State. If a State can not levy and expend taxes for other than 

 public purposes, it may be presumed, a fortiori, that the national 

 Government can not, "for the former can do anything which the 

 Constitution (and natural right) do not forbid ; while the latter 

 can do nothing which the Constitution does not fii^t sanction." 

 The Federal Government has "no right to raise money by taxa- 

 tion for a thousand things for which the State may impose taxes 

 and collect them of the fjeople" (Miller, Justice, Lectures on the 

 Constitution). 



Third, in respect to the instances cited, in which Congress has 

 expended moneys for bounties, or relief of private interests, in 

 this and other countries, it was replied that they were all matters 

 of national charity ; were never subjected to judicial scrutiny, or 

 even seriously challenged in debate ; were never for large amounts, 

 and did not contemplate any special levy of taxes, but were from 

 funds already in the Treasury. It was also claimed that this was 

 the first case in which the constitutionality of a congressional 

 bounty, whether direct or indirect, for " protection," has ever been 



