SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 371 



the universe, they accepted this as a presupposition. To begin with, 

 matter and mind were not one, but two; they were different, that is. 

 Given this difference, then, how explain them? By showing that, in 

 the time series, mind came second, and was therefore caused by 

 matter. The laughable paradox is that men steeped in the biological 

 view, which utterly overturns this mechanical externality, adopted the 

 latter as the means adequate to account for the former ! Of course, a 

 man may do this, if he please, but at his peril. For, Hume and Kant 

 and the biological sciences have combined to show that, even before it 

 could be stated, this doctrine had become, not merely untenable, but 

 positively unthinkable. It was now the philosophers' turn to blas- 

 pheme their brethren of science. If the errors of 'Naturphilosophie' 

 had handed speculative thought over to the tender mercies of exact 

 science, the ludicrous obtuseness of the so-called materialists respecting 

 what was possible in philosophy brought the thinkers their due re- 

 venge. Thus the dispute became interminable and the Jew had no 

 dealings with the Samaritan. For science, philosophy appeared so 

 much vague or formal speculation; for philosophy, science, in so far as 

 it tried to explain the world, seemed nothing but a blind blundering 

 among exploded errors peculiar to Locke and the French encyclope- 

 dists. Despite Lotze's effort at mediation, too complacent towards 

 both parties to command the respect of either, this was the substantial 

 situation from 1850 till 1885. And, when we hear to-day of the 

 opposition between science and pliilosophy, our ears are really ringing 

 with echoes from the period of the great paradox. The later develop- 

 ments of physics, chemistry, biology and psychology have brought 

 scientific men to a point where they can see that the mere adoption of 

 the 'Newtonian philosophy,' minus the 'agent acting constantly accord- 

 ing to certain laws,' is a far too simple solution of the obscure problems 

 on hand. Seductive it may be, it fails notoriously to fill the bill. 

 Similarly, philosophers begin to understand that Hegelianism must 

 go as a system, even though they feel that they must retain Hegel's 

 one contribution to progress — the principle that experience can be 

 explained, if at all, only by reference to itself. Also they evince 

 symptoms of perceiving that the watchword, 'Back to Kant !' valuable 

 enough in 1860, must be replaced by the new rallying cry, 'Forward 

 from Kant.' The critical philosophy cleared a site upon which it 

 is possible and proper for science and speculation to cooperate in 

 building now. 



Science and philosophy may easily return to the old footing, then, 

 if they will but have a mind to rid themselves of the peculiar dogmas 

 that have afflicted each during the last century. This implies mutual 

 self-sacrifice, but sacrifice of the unimportant, very likely of the 

 harmful. There is no good ground for the belief that with the circle 



