THE CREDIT FOR GOOD ACTIONS. 531 



We have seen that, from the point of view of the deterniinist, it 

 seems an eminently reasonable thing to regard certain good actions as 

 deserving of credit rather than others, and to strive to reward them. We 

 have seen also that we can estimate roughly, at least, the amount of the 

 reward that it is desirable to give. There appears to be nothing absurd, 

 and nothing hopelessly mysterious in the whole matter, although our 

 ignorance of human character, its impulses, the motives that can be ex- 

 pected to lead to this or that action, and, indeed, of the whole machinery 

 •of human life, is and must remain very great. But what if we adopt 

 tJie hypothesis of the 'free-willist' ? Let us suppose for the moment 

 that actions can be regarded as creditable only in so far as they are 'free' 

 •or causeless, and let us see whether this will cast a brighter light upon 

 the corner of ethics with which we are concerned. 



The first difficulty which meets us is a seemingly hopeless uncertainty 

 iis to what actions are 'free' and the degree of their 'freedom.' We 

 M'atch Tommy from a distance as he loiters about in the region of the 

 pantr}'. Evidently there is a struggle going on within him. He 

 advances his hand ; he withdraws it ; he takes a step forward ; he looks 

 about apjorehensively ; he touches the key ; he stops to reflect. Finally 

 he sighs, and walks away without having done the deed. Of what war- 

 ring forces has his little mind been tJie theater? Were the combatants 

 but two — love of jam and 'free-will' ? Can we measure the amount of the 

 latter by the degree of opposition which it has met and overcome in the 

 former? Certainly not. Tommy has been whipped before for this 

 ofi'ense. He has been talked to seriously on many occasions, and he is 

 not a bad-hearted boy. Fear of detection may influence him more or 

 lt}ss; the beginning of a love for virtue and a rather well-developed 

 love of approbation count for something. He has within him a germ of 

 ■self-respect. All these things are enlisted on the side of right conduct, 

 and the potent influence of just such forces as these even a 'free-will' 

 parent frankly recognizes, ^o philosopher who has had the fortune to 

 have a son, and who has cared anything about him, has ever delivered 

 him over bodily to the tender mercies of 'free-will.' He keeps prodding 

 at 'free-will,' so to speak, in a more or less deterministic way. It may 

 be his trump card, but he is never willing to throw away the rest of his 

 hand. Accordingly, we must assume that the battle has not been a 

 duel, but a general melee. What measure of credit can 'free-will' as- 

 sume for the result? How shall we apportion our reward for the 

 victory? Does the boy deserve no credit except in so far as be has 

 iicted 'freely' ? 



Moreover, how are we even to know which action should be re- 

 warded? The deterniinist has no great difficulty in picking it out, 

 for the mere sight of the struggle is to him an indicatioon that encour- 

 agement is needed and should be given. The 'f ree-willist' can, of 



