532 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



course, not regard the reward as an encouragement, for it is foolish to 

 attempt to encourage 'free-will.' Could it be 'encouraged' it would 

 evidently not be 'free.' And if this notion of encouragement wholly 

 drops out, there appears no reason why actions performed after a 

 struggle should be regarded as creditable rather than actions performed 

 without any struggle at all. Suppose that Tommy has attained such 

 a fixity of character that he can pass the pantry door twenty times with- 

 out apparent effort. Does this mean that he has lost his love of jam ? 

 May it not mean that he is subject to such generous bursts of 'free-will' 

 that all fleshly inclinations are overcome as soon as they are born ? 

 Then why should he not be rewarded more generously than before, when 

 he had such dribblings of 'free-will' as scarce sufficed to bring him out 

 of the combat alive ? 



It appears, then, that it is impossible to ascertain how much credit 

 is to be allowed for any action, and that it is impossible to discover 

 what actions are to be regarded as creditable. This does not seem en- 

 couraging, and may well tend to dampen our 'free-will' ardor. But we 

 must pluck up our courage, for we are compelled to face a difficulty 

 which is, if possible, more disheartening, Eeflection discloses the fact 

 that our theory forces us to deny the validity of the moral judgments 

 that we have all our lives been passing upon our own actions and those 

 of our fellows. This is so important a point that I must try to make 

 it quite clear. It is a point passed over in silence by the 'free-willist.' 



Let us suppose that Smith sees Jones struggling in the water, and 

 makes desperate efforts to save him from drowning. His efforts are 

 crowned with success, and Jones sits dripping on the bank, with a heart 

 overflowing with gratitude. But he speedily discovers in Smith a 

 creditor whose sole interest in the transaction was a pecuniary one. He 

 saw his money drowning before his eyes, and he di^ihis best to secure it. 

 Does Jones now owe the man both money and gra,tit)Ude, or does he owe 

 him money alone? Let us suppose again that we ' have contemplated 

 with satisfaction the temperate and orderly conduct, of a young man 

 whom we have regarded as exposed to divers temptations. We feared 

 he was going to be dissipated, and we have been agreeably disappointed. 

 We give expression to our pleasure, and he informs us irankly that the 

 least rumor of misconduct would lead his uncle to disinherit him. 

 'Wait,' he says 'until the old man dies, and you will see my good time 

 begin.' Do we, after this avowal, regard him as a model, of virtue, and 

 a youth to be held up as a pattern ? No man rates as a philanthropist 

 the scientific enthusiast who visits the sick with assiduity only in order 

 to secure materials for his contemplated monograph on pain. Before 

 we judge of human actions we try to find out something about their 

 setting. We pry into motives and inquire regarding intentions. Pre- 

 cisely the same act may be good or bad, according to its context. It 



